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ABSTRACT 
 
Although social assistance transfers have grown at a faster pace in recent years 
after independence in South Africa, income inequality still remains one of the 
highest in the world. This thesis uses a top-down, bottom-up model which 
combines an econometrically-estimated microsimulation model of labor supply, a 
detailed tax-benefit module, and a computable general equilibrium model, in order 
to analyze the impact of government social assistance on income inequality and 
poverty in South Africa. The approach accounts for four important aspects. Firstly, 
it accounts for the fact that labor supply adjusts to changes in the tax-benefit 
schedule. Secondly, it accounts for general equilibrium effects, given that reforms 
are likely to have an impact on the whole economy.  Thirdly, it accounts for the 
fact that the government budget should be balanced in simulations. Lastly it can 
fully take into account the heterogeneity of economic agents, since it uses a micro 
data set and also allows for the modeling of the intra-group income distribution. In 
the simulations, we vary government social assistance to low income households 
whilst maintaining a balanced government budget. Simulation results suggest that 
doubling of government social assistance causes significant reductions in both 
income inequality and poverty measures. Doubling social assistance leads to a 
5.5% reduction in poverty if we use a relative poverty measure and a 7% reduction 
if we use an absolute poverty line of R322 per month. In the simulations financing 
social assistance by an increase in income taxes gives the strongest reduction in 
both, poverty and inequality measures in comparison to using commodity taxes. 
Lastly, we also find differences in poverty and inequality measures for the MS-
only model and the linked TD-BU model. This confirms the importance of taking 
price changes from the CGE model to the MS model. Neglecting these price 
changes may slightly overestimate or underestimate inequality and poverty 
measures, depending on which financing option is used. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 Social assistance
1
 has grown at a faster pace in recent years after independence in 
South Africa; however income inequality still remains one of the highest in the 
world. Over the first ten years after independence, the government increased social 
assistance
2
 by more than 70% in real terms
3
 (Van der Berg et al., 2005), but 
income inequality as measured by the Gini-coefficient remains relatively high, at 
around 60%. This has prompted a debate on the South African policy arena, given 
that government resources are limited. The question remains whether these social 
assistance transfers are beneficial as a poverty reduction tool and also whether 
they will be sustainable in the long run. Van der Berg et al. (2005) suggested that, 
social assistance is nearing its limits to alleviate poverty
4
 due to fiscal constraints. 
Fiscal capacity constraints arise from the fact that social assistance spending 
already constitutes a high proportion of GDP (about 3.5%), while such social 
assistance transfers need to compete with other public spending.  
This thesis will use a linked top-down, bottom-up (TD-BU) model (Savard, 
2003) which combines an econometrically-estimated microsimulation (MS) model 
of labor supply, a detailed tax-benefit model and a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, in order to analyze the impact of  government social assistance on 
income inequality and poverty in South Africa. The approach differs from that of 
Savard (2003) in that it uses a detailed tax-benefit module. We are considering a 
different policy scenario, where increases in social assistance are financed by 
different types of taxes. This exercise is interesting as it accounts for four 
important aspects. Firstly, it accounts for the fact that the labor supply adjusts to 
                                                 
1
 The terms “social transfers”, “social benefits” and “social assistance” will be used interchangeably 
throughout the thesis. 
2
 Social assistance are non contributory benefits, mainly offered to the most vulnerable population groups, 
such as the elderly, disabled and children. 
3
  For detailed trends in social assistance see Section 2.1 
4
 Social assistance already constitutes 3.5% of GDP, which is more than twice the median spending across 
developing and transitional economies (Woolard et al., 2010). In addition social assistance is financed by 
tax revenue and it also needs to compete with other social spending like health and education.  
 2 
changes in the tax-benefit schedule. This is important since changes in social 
assistance can alter labor supply incentives. Secondly, it accounts for general 
equilibrium effects, given that reforms are likely to have an impact on the whole 
economy. Thirdly, it considers that the government’s budget should be balanced in 
simulations. This is important as it allows us to perform budget neutral 
experiments when evaluating different financing options. Lastly, it fully takes into 
account the heterogeneity of economic agents, since it uses a micro-data set and 
also allows for assessing the intra-group income distribution. 
All in all, the model utilizes the advantages of the two models (CGE and 
MS models) and compensates for the weaknesses of each of these independent 
models. Accordingly, it contributes insights to the ongoing debate on social 
assistance programs and income redistribution by capturing sys tematic (general 
equilibrium) effects arising from the endogenization of commodity and factor 
prices. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no research focusing on social 
assistance, poverty and inequality using such a bi-directional or ‘top-down, 
bottom-up’ linkage in South Africa so far.  
Accordingly, the overall objective of this study is to use a linked top-down, 
bottom-up CGE-microsimulation in order to identify and quantify the impact of 
social assistance transfers on income inequality and poverty in South Africa. In 
this study we focus mainly on means-tested social assistance transfers, which are 
non-contributory cash social assistance provided by the government to vulnerable 
groups. In this regard we have 
 developed a poverty focused top-down, bottom-up CGE-microsimulation 
model for South Africa
5
, 
 carried out simulations in order to quantify the impact of social assistance 
transfers on income inequality and poverty in South Africa, 
 assessed the impact of different financing options on income inequality and 
poverty, 
 analyzed the impact of these social assistance transfers on the labor supply 
and  
                                                 
5
 Detailed do-files can be obtained from the author on request. Email address: charisoc@yahoo.com. 
 3 
 compared results from the linked (top-down, bottom-up) model with a 
standard unlinked model (MS model).  
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows; Chapter 2 introduces the 
South African tax-benefit system. Chapter 3 reviews results from previous 
literature. Chapter 4 gives a detailed description of the research methodology used. 
It starts by giving a detailed structure of the CGE model, then moves on to explain 
the MS model, which includes both a tax-benefit module and a discrete labor 
supply model and the final part of the same chapter gives a detailed description of 
the linked model, which combines an econometrically-estimated MS model of 
labor supply, a detailed tax-benefit module, and a computable general equilibrium 
model.  Chapter 5 gives the imputation, estimation and calibration of model 
parameters. The first part of this section gives an explanation of the data used in 
the model. The second part of the same chapter gives an explanation of the tax-
benefit module, while the last section gives calibration and estimation of linear 
expenditure system parameters and discrete labor supply parameters. Simulation 
results, inequality and poverty analysis results are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of research findings, recommendations, limitations 
of the study and concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2  
SOCIAL SECURITY AND TAXES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Social assistance background 
2.1.1 History of social assistance programs in South Africa 
 
South Africa inherited a fragmented social security system, which was started 
during the apartheid era, mainly for white people to protect themselves from 
various unexpected future emergencies (Van der Berg, 2002). The South African 
social assistance program started with the establishment of the Children’s 
Protection Act of 1913, which provided maintenance assistance for children. These 
assistances were mainly restricted to non-Africans and no assistance was given to 
rural Africans (Bhorat, 1995). In 1928, the Old Age Pension Act was enacted, 
which provided social (non-contributory) pension assistance to Coloureds (people 
of mixed race) and Whites. At first, Africans and Indians were excluded from the 
scheme. The scheme was only extended to Africans and Indians in 1944, but still 
the value of assistance received differed across racial groups (Bhorat, 1995). In 
1937 a Disability Grant was also established and was only extended to Africans 
and Indians in 1947.  
After independence in 1994, the South African government faced the 
challenge of transforming the existing fragmented social assistance programs into 
one based on comprehensive coverage of the whole population, in an equitable and 
non-racial manner. The Lund Committee in 1996 recommended that the amount 
for children’s assistance should be reduced and restricted to children less than 
seven years old, so as to cover a large number of recipients. The recommendation 
was accepted by the cabinet, and this led to the introduction of the Child Support 
Grant which replaced the maintenance grant in 1998. The system has remained 
unchanged since the implementation of the Child Support Assistance in 1998, with 
adjustments only to grant sizes and age eligibility. 
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2.1.2 Current social assistance programs in South Africa 
 
The main objective of the social assistance programs in South Africa is to reduce 
poverty among people vulnerable to low income, such as the elderly, children, and 
people with disabilities who cannot participate (fully) in the labor market (see 
SASSA website). South Africa has a well-developed social assistance program 
compared to other African countries. In South Africa the social assistance 
programs are administered by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA).  
There are five main non-contributory social assistance transfers in South 
Africa. Social assistance is mainly given as income support to eligible poor and 
vulnerable individuals, mostly the elderly, people with disabilities and children. It 
is a state-funded system, also referred to as social grants in South Africa, which is 
financed entirely from government revenue. This scheme is means-tested and the 
responsibility is upon individuals to prove that they are in need of support. Over 
13 million people (i.e. about a quarter of the total population) received social 
assistance transfers in 2009.   
The five non-contributory social assistance
6
 transfers include the following; 
Social Old Age Pensions (SOAP), Disability Grant (DG), Child Support Grant 
(CSG), Care Dependency Grant (CDG) and Foster Care Grant (FCG). The Social 
Old Age Pension is a means-tested benefit, payable to people of retirement age or 
older. The applicant must not be maintained or cared for in a state institution or  be 
in receipt of another social grant. Disability Grant is a means-tested grant paid to 
disabled people, over 18 years of age but below retirement age, subject to medical 
eligibility criteria.  The Child Support Grant is paid to primary caregivers of 
children in need. Eligibility is determined by a means test which measures the 
caregiver’s financial ability to provide necessary support for the children. Initially , 
the program covered only children less than seven years old, but it was extended 
in 2005 and now covers up to children less than 15 years old. The Care 
Dependency Grant is a means-tested grant payable to children under the age of 18 
years who are in permanent home care and suffering from severe mental and 
                                                 
6
 Social assistance refers to the sum of all non- contributory grants 
 6 
physical disability. Finally the Foster Care Grant is given to foster parents. 
Following court’s approval, a child can be placed under the custody of suitable 
foster parents, under the supervision of a social worker. The aim of the grant is to 
help foster parents cover the costs of caring for a child. Table 2.1 gives a summary 
of non-contributory social assistance in South Africa, for the year 2000. 
Table 2.1: social assistance transfers description and eligibility 
Name of grant Description Requirements Amounts 
per month 
Child Support 
Grant 
Social assistance offered to 
primary caregivers of children 
if combined income of 
caregiver and spouse is below 
a certain threshold. 
Age limit: 0-7 years 
Income means test: 
R800 per month for those in Urban 
areas. R1100 per month for those 
in rural areas or informal dwellings. 
 
 
R100 per 
month 
Foster Care 
Grant 
Following the court’s approval 
a child is placed under the 
custody of a foster parent 
(maybe due to the death of 
both parents). 
 
Age limit: 18 years 
 
 
 
R390 per 
month 
Care 
Dependency 
Grant 
Payable to parents of children 
under 18 years suffering from 
severe mental or physical 
disability. 
Age limit: 18 years 
Income means test: 
Annual household income not 
greater than R48000. 
 
R540 per 
month 
Disability 
Grant 
Means-tested grant given to 
disabled people, subject to a 
medical doctor’s confirmation  
or report. 
 
Age limit: 
18-59 years for females 
18-64 years for males 
Income means test: 
R1250(single) per month 
R2500(Couples) per month 
 
 
R540 per 
month 
Social Old Age 
Grant 
Means-tested benefit paid to 
people of retirement age. 
Age limit: 
Males over 64 years 
Females Over 59 years 
R540 per 
month 
Source: National Treasury, South Africa (August 2004). 
Note: Details apply to the year 2000. 
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In the years after independence, the South African government has 
developed policies designed to reduce poverty and income inequality. In the year 
2007/2008, over 12 million South Africans received social assistance, which is 
approximately 25% of the population. The next table shows the number of grant 
beneficiaries and growth rates from the year 1999 to 2009. 
Table 2.2: Social assistance recipients 1999/00 to 2008/09 
Year       Total grant recipients  Growth rate (%)  
1999/00     2 687 169        5.8 
2000/01     3 773 998     40.4 
2001/02     3 982 801       5.5 
2002/03     4 913 275    23.4 
2003/04     6 476 587    31.8 
2004/05               7 869 143     21.5 
2005/06             10 947 116     39.1 
2006/07             11 983 141         9.5 
2007/08             12 386 396         3.4 
2008/09             13 026 104         5.2 
2009/10    13 779 000      5.8 
2010/11    14 625 000      6.1 
2011/12    15 198 000           4.0 
Sources 1: South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), annual statistical report on  
 social assistance 2008/10. 
Source 2: National Treasury, South Africa: 2013 Budget Review (2009/10-2011/12) 
Note: Growth rates refer to year on year growth rates in total grant recipients.  
 
Table 2.2 suggests that there has been a significant increase in the number 
of grant recipients since 1999. The government increased social  assistance by 
more than 70 percent in real terms over a 10 year period after independence (Van 
der Berg et al., 2005). The growth in social assistance was driven mainly by an 
increase in the number of beneficiaries for both Child Support Grant and 
Disability Grant. The increase in Child Support Grant was mainly due to an 
increase in the take-up rate and also to extension of the grant from children less 
than 7 years to children less than 15 years in 2005.  
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Table 2.3 shows social assistance expenditure by type of grant from the 
year 2001 to 2010. 
Table 2.3: Social assistance expenditures by type of assistance 2001/02 to 2009/10 
Grant type 
R' Million  2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05       2005/06     
 
SOAP   12 954  15 285  17 146  18 504  19 996 
DG        4 585    7 201  10 329  12 570  14 438 
FCG             364       787    1 142    1 563    2 044 
CDG           226       309       639       760       938 
CSG      2 400    4 558    7 690  11 431  14 483 
Other            24         28         36         56         29 
Total    20 553             28 168            36 982            44 885            51 927 
 
Continued...  
 
R' Million  2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10  
  
 
SOAP   21 222  22 801  25 934   29 991 
DG    14 261  15 280  16 474   16 853 
FCG     2 851    3 414    3 934     4 362 
CDG     1 006    1 132    1 292     1 356 
CSG   17 559    1 925  22 348   27 273 
Other        133       215       733        260 
Total   57 032  62 467  70 715   80 080 
Source 1: Provincial Budgets and Expenditures Review: 2001/02 – 2007/08. 
Source 2: Year 2006 onwards: Woolard et al., 2010. 
Note: Statistics taken from two different sources.  
 
Table 2.3 shows that there has been a sharp increase in most social 
assistance over the period 2001 to 2010. Social Old Age Pension, Child Support 
Grant and Disability Grant are the largest grant types in terms of overall 
expenditure. Over the years, the share of spending on the Child Support Grant has 
increased relative to that of other social assistance. In 2001/02 the expenditure on 
the Child Support Grant accounted for about 11.6 % of total social grant 
expenditures, but by the year 2009/10 it accounted for over 30.5 % of total social 
grant expenditures. 
The next table shows social assistance expenditures as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP).  
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Table 2.4: Social assistance expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 2000/01 to 2009/0 
Year     Social expenditure (R' million)   % of GDP 
2001/02    20 553      2.0 
2002/03    28 168      2.4 
2003/04    36 982      2.9 
2004/05    44 885      3.2 
2005/06    51 927      3.4 
2006/07    57 032      3.3 
2007/08    62 467      3.2 
2008/09    70 715      3.2 
2009/10    89 368      3.5 
2010/11    92 806      3.4 
2011/12            101 320      3.4 
Source 1: Provincial Budgets and Expenditure Review: 2001/02 – 2007/08. 
Source 2: Year 2006 onwards: Woolard et al., 2010. 
Source 3: National Treasury, South Africa: 2013 Budget Review (2009/10-2011/12) 
Note: Statistics taken from three different sources. 
 
Total social assistance expenditures have risen from R20.6 billion (2.0% of 
GDP) in 2001/02 to R101.3 billion (3.4% of GDP) in 2011/12. This translates to 
about a 392% increase in overall social assistance expenditures (in nominal terms). 
Expenditures on social assistance almost doubled from 2% of GDP in 1994 to 
about 3.4% of GDP in 2012.  The level of social assistance spending in South 
Africa at present is extremely high, even in comparison to that of other middle 
income countries and countries in transition. According to Weigand and Grosh 
(2008), social assistance as a percentage of GDP is about 1% in Mexico and below 
2% in Brazil. Therefore it’s clear that South Africa has a sizeable social assistance 
program in comparison to that of other middle income and transitional countries, 
implying that it has a well-developed social assistance program.  
Non-contributory social assistance (cash) transfers are an important source 
of income for poor households (HH) in South Africa. Social assistance represents 
a larger proportion of income for the poor, as highlighted by the next table. 
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Table 2.5: Composition of income by household type 
Income category      Low income (%)     High income (%)        Total (%)  
 
Highly skilled labor     1.750   34.726   31.188 
Skilled labor    19.681   23.679   23.250 
Low skilled labor   19.722     6.935     8.306 
Capital income   18.302   31.036   29.670 
Inter household transfers  16.577     1.007     2.677 
Social assistance   23.877     2.587     4.871 
Rest of the world      0.09    0.030     0.038 
Total        100      100       100 
Source: Own calculations using the income and expenditure household survey (IES- 
2000). 
Note: Equivalized income was used as explained in the footnote number 7 below. 
 
From Table 2.5 above, low income households (those with lowest 40% of 
equivalized gross income
7
) get 24% of their total income from social or government 
transfers, while high income households (those with highest 60% of equivalized gross 
income) get only 2%. Hence, government spending on social assistance in South Africa 
appears to be well targeted. To support this, Woolard (2003) explains that in the year 
2000, 66% of total income of the poorest 20% of the South African population was social 
assistance, while less than 1% of income of the richest 20% of population was social 
assistance income.  
 
2.2 South African tax system  
2.2.1 Overview of the South African tax system 
 
The South African Revenue Services (SARS) is responsible for collecting and 
administering all taxes in order to ensure compliance with tax law. The following 
tax types are in operation in South Africa: income tax, corporate income tax, 
capital gains tax, value added tax, excise duty, transfer duty, estate duty, stamp 
                                                 
7
 We used adjusted total income figures or equivalized income which takes into account differences in the 
size and structure of household. This equivalence scale was calculated as follows: 
Adult equivalized scale:
 )( KAE  . 
Where A is number of adults in the household,   is fraction representation of children (K) in adult 
equivalized scale and θ is a scale parameter (capturing economies of scale).  
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duty, skills development levy, air passenger tax, donations tax, retirement fund 
tax, unemployment insurance fund (UIF) and other taxes.  
Personal income tax is the government’s main source of revenue, 
contributing 34.3% to total revenue for the 2009/2010 fiscal year (Innovative 
Medicines South Africa, 2011). We will focus mainly on personal income since it 
is the one which will be used as the main source of financing increase in 
government transfers. The following table shows personal income tax expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Table 2.6: Personal income tax value as a percentage of total revenue and GDP (1994-
2010) 
 Year   Value (R' million)     As a % of     As a % of GDP 
                                                            total revenue   
1994/95 44 972.8 39.5               9.0 
1995/96 51 179.3 40.2                9.1 
1996/97 59 519.8 40.4                9.4 
1997/98 68 342.4 41.3                9.8 
1998/99 77 733.9 42.1              10.3 
1999/00 85 883.8 42.7              10.3 
2000/01 86 478.0 39.3 9.1 
2001/02 90 389.5 35.8 8.6 
2002/03 94 336.7 33.5 7.9 
2003/04 98 495.1 32.6 7.6 
2004/05 110 982 31.3 7.7 
2005/06 125 645 30.1 7.8 
2006/07 140 578 28.4 7.7 
2007/08 168 774 29.5 8.1 
2008/09 195 115 31.2 8.4 
2009/10 205 145 34.3 8.4 
 
Source: South African Revenue Services. 
Note: Values given in nominal terms. 
 
From the table above it can be seen that there have been slight reductions in 
personal income tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, from the year 1999 to 2010.  
2.2.2 Personal income tax calculations in South Africa 
In South Africa, income tax is levied according to the ‘Income Tax Act’ 58 of 
1962. Since 1995, the tax rate has been applied to all individuals, irrespective of 
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gender, marital status or number of children. Personal income tax is one of the 
government’s main sources of revenue. In January 2001, South Africa changed 
from a source based tax system to a resident based tax system
8
. That is, residents
9
 
are subject to tax in South Africa on their worldwide income and capital gains, 
while non-residents are taxed on their South African-source income and capital 
gains on immovable assets situated in South Africa. Tax rates on individuals are 
progressive, that is tax rate increases as the taxable income increases.   
 Individuals receive most of their income from, among others, labor 
(salaries and wages), capital (interest and dividends) and business income (sole 
proprietor and partners) which are taxable as personal income. All these form what 
is called “gross income” or “total income”. The next table summarizes how tax 
payable is calculated in South Africa. 
Table 2.7: Income Tax calculations 
Income Tax calculations 
 
Gross income (total income from different sources) 
 
Less exemption (accruals and receipts of government organizations, local authorities)  
 
= Income 
 
Less deductions (pension and retirement contributions, medical aid contributions  
charitable contributions, dividends, donations made, losses incurred, depreciation)  
=Taxable income 
 
Apply tax rules to get payable tax values 
 
Less tax rebates 
 
=Net tax paid 
Source: South African Revenue Services. 
Note: Tax rebate is a refund offered when people pay more taxes than they owe. Details 
of the tax schedule are given in Appendix A. 
                                                 
8
 Under the resident system, income which is accrued to a resident of a country should be subject to taxes 
of that country. Whereas under a source based system, income is taxed in the country where it originates 
regardless of physical resident of income recipient.  
9
 A person is considered resident for tax purposes if he or she is ordinarily resident in South Africa or is not 
ordinarily resident in South Africa but has been physically present in South Africa for at least 91 days 
during each of the current and proceeding 5 tax years and more than 915 days in total during the previous 5 
tax years.   
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Exemptions and deductions are subtracted from gross income in order to get 
taxable income (tax base). The tax schedule is then applied in order to get the actual tax 
paid. 
2.3    Inequality background  
 
South Africa is statistically a middle income country with an average per capita 
income that is one of the highest on the continent, but its income inequality is 
among the highest in the world, with the overall Gini coefficient of around 60 
percent (Pauw and Mncube, 2007) using household gross income. The South 
African income inequality dates back to the apartheid era, where exclusions were 
made based on race and class, but now it is increasingly determined by inequality 
within population groups. The next diagram shows the trends in South African 
income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
Table 2.8: Trends in South African Inequality as measured by Gini coefficient 
        Year        Gini Coefficient 
1970          51 
1980          49 
1993          59 
1995          59 
2000          58 
2005          58 
Source: United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research 
database (UNU-WIDER).  
Note: Using household incomes from various surveys. 
 
From Table 2.8 it can be seen that inequality stagnates at high level after 
1993, despite the increase in social assistance transfers. Different studies using 
different datasets have confirmed that income inequality has remained relatively 
constant after independence (Statistics South Africa 2002, Hoogeveen and Özler, 
2004, Van der Berg et al., 2004, Ardington et al., 2005, Leibbrandt et al., 2006, 
Yu, 2010). Van der Berg (2010) summarized the trends in inequality by 
highlighting that there was a strong upward trend in inequality as measured by 
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Gini-coefficient in the second half of the 90’s and stable inequality thereafter, but 
still inequality remains high.   
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CHAPTER 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1  Theoretical literature review  
 
Public or government policies have two main roles; achieving efficiency by 
correcting market failures and improving the distribution of income and poverty 
outcomes that would result from a market- based allocation of resources. This 
thesis mainly concentrates on the second role.  
Pigou-Dalton’s ‘principle of transfers’, play a central role in the literature of 
income redistribution. The principle states that a progressive transfer
10
 of income 
between two persons reduces income inequality and enhances social welfare  
(Dalton, 1920). Sen (1976) introduced the ‘transfer axiom’, which is a limited 
form of the ‘principle of transfer’ in poverty measurement.  The axiom states that 
a transfer of income from a poor person to someone poorer reduces poverty.  
Atkinson et al. (1995) argued that poverty reduction and income 
redistribution are not the only purposes of social assistance transfer systems. Other 
reasons include provision of insurance, which is not provided by the private sector 
and to provide distribution of family income through time (for example through 
unemployment benefits). Nevertheless, poverty reduction and income 
redistribution are the main objectives of such schemes. However there are varying 
beliefs concerning the effectiveness of social assistance transfers on income 
inequality. Well-targeted social assistance transfers are expected to reduce income 
inequality since they transfer from high income groups to low income groups. The 
main critique of social assistance transfers stem from the ‘welfare dependency’ 
theory. It is argued that tax and transfer programs interfere with incentives to 
work, save and invest. Redistributive programs may foster dependence on social 
assistance and thereby increase the poverty rate (Lee, 1987 and Murray, 1984). 
According to this argument, for many poor individuals with unskilled labor it 
makes sense financially to live off social assistance transfers rather than take a 
                                                 
10
 Transfer from high income to low income earners. 
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low-wage job. In addition, means-tested social assistance can reduce incentives to 
work by requiring beneficiaries and their spouses to fall below a certain income 
threshold.  
Some researchers argue that social assistance policies undermine economic 
growth and thereby fail to reduce the number of poor in the long run, even if they 
do provide some temporary near-term assistance (Alesina and Perotti, 1997 and 
Arrow, 1979).  In addition, others argue that social assistance transfers can crowd 
out assistance from private institutions and charitable organizations (see Cox, 
Hansen, Jimenez, 1999). Lastly other researchers argue that too little of the money 
reaches the poor (vertical targeting or efficiency) (Lee, 1987). It is certainly true 
that a substantial share of the government social assistance tend to go to the 
middle and upper classes rather than to the poor. Closely related to this is the view 
that social assistance may not reach all poor people (horizontal targeting or 
efficiency). On the other hand, having an assured stream of income could help 
individuals cover some of their job search costs, and can  also be used to finance 
small enterprise creation, which will ensure a normal stream of income later and 
help reduce income inequality. Any adverse impact of income redistribution, such 
as crowding out of investment or reduction of work effort, may be offset or even 
outweighed by these and other beneficial effects (Kenworthy, 1998 and Perotti, 
1996). In view of all these differences of opinion, there is still need to explore 
more in this area. 
 
3.2  Empirical review  
3.2.1 Studies from other developing and middle – income countries 
 
In developing and middle income economies a lot of independent models have 
been used to analyze the impact of social assistance on inequality and poverty. 
Empirical results from these studies can provide important lessons for South 
Africa, since they belong to the same income group. Bourguignon et al . (2002) 
carried out an ex-ante evaluation of a conditional cash transfer program using 
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Brazil’s Bolsa Escola program as a case study. They found that the program would 
reduce poverty incidences by only one percentage point and the Gini coefficient by 
half a percentage point. They concluded that governments should make more 
substantial transfers to make a big impact. Chia et al . (1994) analyzed poverty 
reduction targeting programs using a general equilibrium model for Cote d’Ivore. 
They found that when general equilibrium effects are considered it is more 
difficult to eliminate poverty, since prices of products bought by poor people 
increase and they bear some of the financing burden through indirect taxes. In 
addition, they found that at the national level a targeting program to all which 
redistributes income from high income to low income households will have the 
greatest effect, reducing poverty by seven percentage points. Coady and Harris 
(2001) used a CGE model to evaluate targeted cash transfers for Mexico, and 
found that combining transfer programs with efficient tax reforms benefited poor 
households through general equilibrium changes in income and prices.  
Lehman (2010) used the Mexican’s Progresa program to analyze the impact 
of government social assistance transfers on rural inequality. He concluded that 
the impact of such government transfer programs on reducing rural inequality may 
be lower than previously thought. This stems from the fact that the program-
eligible lower tail and the program-ineligible upper tail of the community do not 
behave in isolation from each other. He showed that interactions in credit and 
insurance, as well as factor and commodity markets led to a situation whereby 
government social assistance transfers granted to the lower tail of the village led to 
welfare improvements at the program’s ineligible upper tail 11.  Hence, this will 
only lead to a modest effect on reducing inequality.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 First, low income households of the community reallocate part of the transfers to higher income 
households in the form of credit and gifts. Second, the higher income households accrue additional income 
from supplying commodities which are consumed in higher proportion by those in low income.  
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3.2.2 South African studies 
 
For empirical applications to South Africa, Thompson and Schoeman (2007) 
developed a static microsimulation model. Their model only considers personal 
income taxes and not social assistance. In addition, the model is a static model 
without any behavioral changes and does not model macro variables. There is also 
a tax-benefit model called SAMOD, which was developed by the Centre for the 
Analysis of South African Social Policy at Oxford University.  This is also a 
partial equilibrium model, which does not consider general equilibrium effects. 
In addition many other partial equilibrium models have been used to study 
the impact of an increase in social assistance transfers on income inequality and 
poverty in South Africa. Samson et al. (2004) used a microsimulation model in 
order to analyze the social and economic impact of South Africa’s Social Security 
System.  They found that full take-up of social assistance transfers would lead to a 
3 percentage point reduction in Gini coefficient and also that South Africa’s social 
assistance reduce poverty headcount measure by 4.3%. Armstrong and Burger 
(2008) used a decomposition technique to investigate the impact of social 
assistance on poverty and inequality in South Africa. They found that social 
assistance programs have a considerable impact on poverty, since they are 
effective in pushing the poor closer to the poverty line. However, they found that 
social assistance have a negligible impact on inequality. The main reason for this 
is that inequality is mainly driven by the upper end of income distribution, a group 
that does not receive social assistance. Haarman (2000) modeled the impact of 
existing social assistance on poverty in South Africa and tested the impact of 
potential reforms using a microsimulation model. He found that if the system was 
to work with a 100% efficiency it would be able to close the poverty gap by 36.8% 
in the first two quintiles.   
Overall there seem to be a consensus on the  impact of social assistance 
programs on poverty, which ranges from single digit to double digit figures 
depending on which poverty indicator is used, either poverty headcounts or 
poverty gaps. The figures also depend on whether or not the study covered only 
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program participants or measured the impact on national poverty. There are 
somehow mixed perceptions in relation to the impact of government social 
assistance transfers on income inequality, ranging from slight to significant 
reductions. In addition, most of these models are partial equilibrium models or 
only CGE models, which have many shortcomings from the discussion given in 
the next chapter. The two should be regarded as complements in order to combine 
the strength of the two models. This analysis will be very useful in filling this gap.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This chapter gives a detailed description of the research methodology used in this 
thesis. The first part gives a review of different methodologies, while the second 
part describes the computable general equilibrium model, and the third part of the 
same chapter deals with the microsimulation model. The last part gives the linked 
or top-down, bottom-up model.  
4.1 Review of different methodologies 
 
Both microsimulation and computable general equilibrium models have been used 
separately to assess distributional effects of social assistance. Microsimulations 
are tools that allow the simulation of the effects of a policy on a sample of 
economic agents (individual, households, and firms) at the individual level and 
they originated with Orcutt in 1957. One main disadvantage of a static arithmetic 
microsimulation is that it does not take into account changes in behavior of 
consumers; it only captures the so called “first round effects” of policy reform. 
This led to the development of behavioral microsimulation models. These include 
a detailed representation of behavioral responses of consumers (see Creedy and 
Duncan, 2002 and Van Soest, 1995). A particular strength of microsimulation is 
that it fully takes into account the heterogeneity of economic agents, since it deals 
with micro data sets. It is possible to include great detail of characteristics in 
behavioral equations. However, microsimulation models in general are typically 
partial equilibrium models that do not take into account changes in relative prices 
even though they directly affect household welfare on the consumption side and 
household income on the production side. This approach can be misleading when 
evaluating the effects of some policies that aim precisely at reallocating output 
more efficiently and assessing the poverty impact of such policies.  
Computable general equilibrium models have also been applied to income 
distribution (Adelman and Robinson, 1978 and Coady and Harris, 2001). Coady 
and Harris (2001) pointed out that CGE modeling is justified if social assistance 
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transfers are large in size and also to address the economic impact that originates 
in the tax structure used to finance transfers. Its main advantage is that it explicitly 
considers general equilibrium effects; however, CGE models typically include a 
limited number of households (representative households) and hence cannot 
explicitly deal with intra-group income distribution. Yet since poverty may affect 
people in groups differently, it is also important to study intra-group income 
distribution (Decaluwé et al., 1999a). Cockburn (2002) reiterated this point by 
stating that there is increasing evidence that households in a given category are 
affected differently by different policy reforms. Parametric distributions have been 
used to measure intra-group variations, for example by assuming households’ 
income distribution follows beta, lognormal or gamma distribution, but choice of 
distribution is arbitrary since there is no economic behavior behind this change in 
intra-group distribution (Savard, 2003). Researchers in South Africa suggested 
that intra-group inequality makes a substantial contribution to overall inequality 
(Bhorat et al., 2001). In addition, certain types of equations that are commonly 
included in a behavioral model, such as switching regime equations like 
occupational choice equations, are not easily modeled within the standard CGE 
modeling software (Savard, 2003).  
Researchers now work with CGE-microsimulation models in order to 
combine the strength of both CGE and microsimulation models. There are various 
ways to link these models. The first is the integrated approach, where 
representative household groups in the CGE model are substituted by as many 
households as can be found in the household survey (Cockburn, 2002 and Cogneau 
and Robilliard, 2007). 
The integrated approach avoids the use of representative households and 
considers intra-group inequalities. When using this approach full reconciliation 
between micro and macro data is essential, and this can lead to changes in the 
structure of either the social accounting matrix (SAM)
12
 data or the household 
                                                 
12
 A social accounting matrix is the main database for the CGE model. It is a square matrix that shows the 
transactions taking place in an economy during an accounting period, usually one year. 
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survey data. The main disadvantage of using this approach is that it imposes limits 
in modeling of microeconomic household behaviors.  
The second approach is the top-down (sequential) approach, where initially 
a CGE model is run and then changes of some selected variables are passed on to 
the microsimulation model (Robilliard et al., 2001 and Herault, 2005).  
Still, just like the prior approach, it avoids the use of representative 
households and considers intra-group inequalities. The main advantage of using 
this approach compared to the previous one is that there is flexibility in household 
behavior specification. Unlike the first approach, full reconciliation of the micro 
and macro data sets is not required, which according to Herault (2005) also 
implies lack of theoretical consistency since nothing guarantees coherence 
between the two models. The main drawback of this approach according to Savard 
(2003) is that the MS model does not provide feedback to the CGE model, though 
partial and not complete feedback effects of household behavior can be taken into 
account by computing aggregate elasticities from household survey data to the 
CGE model. The approach is also considered inappropriate when policy changes 
are specified at the household level, like with cash transfer programs 
(Bourguignon et al., 2008).  
The third approach is the so called top-down, bottom-up approach. A loop 
is used to run both models iteratively until convergence is achieved (Savard, 
2003). According to Savard (2003), the approach is mainly useful because 
feedback effects provided by the household model do not correspond to aggregate 
behavior of the representative households in the CGE model, hence the need to 
take back these feedback effects from the household model to the CGE model. 
Further details of this approach will be given in Section 4.4. 
Other general advantages of this linked model are as follows: Firstly, there 
is no obligation of scaling survey data to national accounts since the approach uses 
percentage changes (variations) from one model to the other. Secondly, there is a 
higher degree in choices of functional forms since the two models run separately. 
For example the MS model can include discrete choice integer behavior which 
might be difficult to incorporate in a CGE model. Lastly it allows for feedback 
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effects from the MS model to the CGE model. Feedback effects provided by the 
microsimulation model do not always correspond to aggregate behavior of 
representative households in the CGE model. Savard (2003) highlighted that 
aggregation error is a key element in determining the importance of information 
lost from lack of feedback effect.  He went on to say that if the behavior of 
representative households in the CGE is perfect aggregation of behavior in the 
microsimulation model, then there is no value added in taking back feedback 
effects. 
All in all, more could be explained on the impact of social assistance transfers on 
income inequality and poverty if we make use of a CGE-microsimulation model. This 
will contribute to the current debate on social assistance programs and income 
distribution by capturing systematic effects that were not captured by other techniques 
before. Changes in transfer programs imply alterations in both relative prices and 
quantities that cannot be ignored.  
 
4.2 CGE model 
 
In this section we build a CGE model which will be used to analyze the impact of 
social assistance transfers on income inequality and poverty. We will use two 
different versions of the CGE model, version 1 and version 2. Version 1 of the 
CGE model will be used for the CGE-only model while version 2 will be used for 
the linked TD-BU model. In the empirical analysis section, we start by using the 
CGE-only model before applying the linked TD-BU model. This is done for two 
main reasons. Firstly, in order to fully explain what happens in the CGE model as 
we increase social assistance transfers to poor households before we link the two 
models (CGE and microsimulation model). Secondly, in this model (CGE-only 
model), we are using more household groups which are disaggregated according to 
exogenous household characteristics and not only according to income level 
(which is the case in the linked TD-BU model, mainly to simplify the analysis
13
). 
Roberts and Zolkiewski (1996) argued that for purposes of simulation analysis, 
                                                 
13
 Since at this point the linkage is done manually.  
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homogeneity of behavior and interests may be more important than homogeneity 
of income.  
 The two versions of the CGE model mainly differ in terms of closure rules
14
. 
In version 1 of the CGE model we use an investment-driven closure, where 
savings adjust to maintain a fixed level of investment. Having a fixed level of 
investment (investment-driven closure) in single period CGE analysis is argued to 
prevent misleading welfare effects that arise from diminishing capital stock in 
later periods. On the other hand in version 2 we have a savings-driven closure 
rule, where investment adjusts in order to maintain a fixed level of savings. This 
was done in order to facilitate the linkage where we initially fix marginal 
propensity to save (mps) and then relax it later after changing the hypothesis of the 
CGE model in order to make it fully determined (see Section 4.4 for detailed 
explanation of the linked TD-BU model). The details of the two versions of the 
CGE model are given in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2 respectively. 
4.2.1 CGE Model version 1 
4.2.1.1 Basic model  
 
We use a standard computable general equilibrium, which was developed by the 
international food policy research institute (Lofgren et al., 2002).  The model is a 
static, single period CGE model. It can be classified as a neoclassical structuralist 
model, originally presented in Dervis de Melo and Robinson (1982). The 
neoclassical economic school of thought typically involves rational utility 
maximization or profit maximization using available information. The model was 
used because it has features which are of particular relevance to a developing 
economy, such as home consumption of non-marketed goods, the explicit 
treatment of transaction costs and separation between production activities and 
commodities that permit any activities to produce multiple commodities (e.g. dairy 
activity can produce commodities cheese, yoghurt and milk) and any commodity 
to be produced by multiple activities. 
                                                 
14
 See Section 4.2.1.3 for detailed explanations of closure rules. 
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The main features of the model are standard so the description here is brief 
(see Lofgren et al., 2002 for a detailed description). Producers, each represented 
by a sector or activity, are assumed to maximize profits subject to their existing 
production technology.  A nested structure of production is adopted. At the top 
level the producer must decide on the combination of intermediate inputs and 
factors of production (value added and intermediaries) to be used in the production 
process. For this purpose a Leontief function is used, hence intermediate input 
demands are in fixed proportions relative to the output of each activity. At a lower 
level of production, the producer decides on how to combine different factors of 
production, and for this purpose a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function is used. Figure 4.1 gives a summary of the production structure. 
 
Figure 4.1: Production technology 
 
Source: Lofgren, 2002. 
Commodity output 
Activity level 
(Leontief function) 
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(CES function) 
Intermediate 
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Composite commodities 
Imported Domestic 
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Final demand is met through either domestically produced goods or 
imported goods. Supply of these two is combined to form a composite good. 
Following Armington (1969), imported and domestic products are imperfect 
substitutes which allow for intra-trade. Substitution possibilities also exist 
between production for the domestic and the foreign markets. This decision of 
producers is governed by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function 
which differentiates between exported and domestic goods. Under the small -
country assumption, South Africa is assumed to face a perfectly elastic world 
demand at a fixed world price.  
Households receive income from returns to factors of production and 
transfers from other institutions, for example transfers from the government, the 
rest of the world and from other households. They use this income to pay taxes, 
save, consume and to make transfers to other institutions. Household consumption 
is apportioned across different products according to a linear expenditure system 
(LES), derived from maximization of a Stone-Geary utility function.  In the basic 
model, direct taxes and transfers to other institutions (apart from inter -household 
transfers) are defined as fixed shares of household income, whereas savings shares 
are flexible. All transfers to and from the rest of the world (ROW) are fixed in 
foreign currency. The government receives income from taxes and transfers from 
the rest of the world, which it spends on consumption and transfers. The enterprise 
receives income from factors of production and transfers from other institutions. It 
uses this income to pay for direct taxes, savings and transfers to other institutions.   
A key feature of the CGE model is that it can only determine relative 
prices, making it necessary to choose some price or price index to define a 
numéraire. The producer price index (DPI) acts as a numéraire in the model. 
 
4.2.1.2 Changes made to the standard Lofgren model 
 
The present model modifies the standard Lofgren model in several respects . 
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Modification 1: Endogenous commodity taxes 
 Firstly, contrary to the Lofgren model which allows only direct taxes by firms and 
households to vary (being the only endogenous tax variable) thereby automatically 
becoming the only adjustable source of financing transfers, we endogenized 
commodity taxes, so that they can be used as an additional adjustable source of 
public revenue. This enables us to study different financing options. To do this the 
following equation was added to the standard Lofgren model:  
 
)1(* tQrtQtQ  ,         (4.1) 
where tQ is commodity tax rate, tQ  is the exogenous part of commodity tax rate, 
tQr is the scaling factor for commodity tax
15
. 
 
Modification 2: Endogenous inter-household transfers 
Secondly, given that inter-household transfers constitute a greater proportion (17% 
of total income for low income households; see Table 2.5 in Chapter 2) of the 
overall income of poor people in South Africa, these transfers were endogenized in 
the model
16
. This was done by calibrating a marginal propensity to transfer for all 
payers of transfers (MPT) and these transfers were then pooled into an aggregate 
amount which was then distributed according to a proportion for each household 
receiver. 
 
Modification 3: Introduction of the wage curve 
Thirdly, South Africa is an economy with high levels of unemployment; therefore 
we have incorporated imperfections in the labor market by a wage curve 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990)
17
. The following wage curve equation was used: 
                                                 
15
 The tax base is the quantity of commodity. 
16
 As proposed by Boccanfuso et al. (2013). However the main weakness of using this approach in 
endogenising household transfers is that transfers will only increase with income of the donators, whereas 
the income of the receivers plays no role. 
17
 The wage curve postulates a negative relationship between real wages and unemployment. The negative 
relationship can be explained by both the efficiency wage model and the wage bargaining power. 
According to the efficiency wage model, the firm motivates workers to be efficient by means of attractive 
salaries, but in situations of high unemployment the fear of losing their jobs forces workers to be more 
efficient. According to the bargaining power theory, trade unions are worried about both employed and 
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UN
CPI
W
  ,         (4.2) 
 
where W  is the average wage rate, CPI  is the consumer price index, UN  is the 
unemployment rate,   is a scale parameter and   is the unemployment elasticity 
of wages
18
. Parameter   which describes marginal changes in the level of real 
wages following a change in unemployment is by assumption negative (See 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) for a graphical representation of the wage 
curve).    
The wage curve was used instead of the conventional way of fixing nominal 
wage rate in CGE modeling, mainly because it gives a better reflection of reality. 
Mabugu et al. (2007) experimented with the conventional approach of modeling 
unemployment in CGE models of nominally fixing the wage rate for unskilled 
labor and found it unsatisfactory, since it leads to very high volatility and 
instability in skilled wage rates and the return on capital, as they are forced to 
handle more than their share of the factor market adjustment burden.  
 
Modification 4: Endogenous labor supply 
Lastly, labor supply was made endogenous in the model in order to capture its 
variations due to changes in disposable income. Endogenous labor supply was 
introduced into the model by extending a set of consumer goods to include leisure  
(see Annabi, 2003). Leisure is treated as a normal good, with an opportunity cost 
equal to the wage rate. An increase in the wage rate has both a substitution effect 
(SE) and an income effect (IE). An increase in the wage rate raises the opportunity 
cost of leisure and induces the consumer to work more (substitution effect), while 
on the other hand, an increase in the wage rate raises real income, thus increasing 
the consumption of normal goods, including leisure (income effect), and 
                                                                                                                                                 
unemployed members. High unemployment means that more of their members are likely to be unemployed 
and it will be difficult for those laid off to get a job. Hence an increase in unemployment may change 
unions’ preferences towards increases in the number of jobs, which implies low pay. 
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decreasing the quantity of labor supply. Typically, the total effect takes the form 
of a backward bending labor supply curve.  
Figure 4.2: Backward bending Labor supply curve 
 
Source: Annabi, 2003. 
 
Households maximize a Stone-Geary utility function subject to their budget 
constraints, yielding linear expenditure system demands. The consumer chooses 
between consumption of different consumer goods ( HqC ) and leisure time ( Hl ) as 
follows: 
 
Maximize:    min
1
lnln llCU HHqHq
n
q
HqH 

 ,   (4.3) 
 
                                                                  ,     (4.4) 
  
   With   1
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where H denotes household groups and q denotes categories of goods. In 
addition, Hq is minimum expenditure of good q , Hq is marginal budget share for 
good q , represents share of leisure in utility function19, qP is price level,
*
HY  is 
potential income of household group H  and 
minl is minimum leisure time
20
.    
This will yield the following consumer and leisure demand functions:  
 






 
j
HjjH
q
Hq
HqHq wlPY
P
C min* 

 ,      (4.6) 
 






 
j
HjjHH wlPY
w
ll min*min 

,        (4.7) 
where wlYY HH 
* , subscript j denotes all other goods and HY is total income. 
The resulting demand functions are the sum of minimal and discretionary 
components (what is in parenthesis). Discretionary or supernumerary income 
represents income available after satisfaction of minimal consumption. From the 
maximization problem one derives consumer demand and leisure demand. Then 
labor supply can be derived from leisure demand, making use of the fact that total 
hours ( T ) are equal to working time plus leisure time ( l ).  
4.2.1.3 Closure rules  
 
In order to bring about equilibrium in various macro accounts, it is necessary to 
specify a set of macro-closure rules, which provide a mechanism through which 
adjustment is assumed to take place. In mathematical terms closure rules basically 
refer to different specifications of endogenous and exogenous variables
21
 (Weiss 
and Khan, 2006). The model includes three broad macroeconomic accounts: the 
                                                 
19
 Parameters β and  are assumed positive.  
20
 Please note that   and minl are not household specific, as we could not find household specific 
elasticity of labor supply (from previous studies) which is needed in order t o calibrate these 
parameters. In addition labor supply is modelled according to skill type or labor category and not 
according to household groups in the model; this also explains why the wage rate is not 
household specific. 
21
 Closure rules ensure the equality of endogenous variables and equations.  
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government balance, the current account, and the savings and investment account. 
The specifications of the macro closures of the CGE model form an essential part 
of the process of adapting a real CGE model for macro analysis. Below is a brief 
description of these macro closure rules. 
First, for external balance:  
FeXnettransfM  )( ,        (4.8) 
where M denotes imports of goods and services, )(nettransf is net foreign transfers 
(showing the net of both factor transfers to ROW and institutional transfers from 
ROW), X is exports of goods and services, F is capital import, i.e. savings or 
deficit of foreigners in the domestic country and Upper-case letters with a bar 
represents exogenous variables. In the model we are assuming a flexible exchange 
rate in order to maintain a fixed level of foreign savings. In other words, the 
external balance is held fixed in foreign currency. The trade balance is effectively 
held constant, since the remaining components of the external balance (i.e. 
transfers between the rest of the world and other domestic institutions) are all 
fixed in the model
22
. For example, if foreign savings are below the exogenous 
level this would induce depreciation in the real exchange rate, and this would 
result in a fall in imports and a rise in exports until the trade balance is restored to 
its original level.  
Secondly, for savings and investment balance:  
j
j
jFGN IPSSS  ,        (4.9) 
where NS  is non-governmental savings, GS  is government savings, FS  is foreign 
savings and I  is investment.  An investment-driven closure is assumed, in that the 
overall savings rate adjusts to maintain a fixed level of investment. In order to 
generate sufficient savings to equal the cost of investment, the savings rates of 
selected non-governmental institutions are adjusted until a balance is reached. In 
Johansen closure it is assumed that savings adjust through some forced savings 
mechanism imposed by the government. For example, the central bank can 
increase private banks’ reserve requirement ratio, thereby forcing up interest rates 
                                                 
22
 Apart from the exchange rate. 
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and promoting savings, or the government may be able to manage inflation and 
induce people to save. Johansen closure is argued to avoid misleading welfare 
effects that appear when foreign savings increase or real investment decrease since 
a single period analysis does not capture welfare losses in later periods that arise 
from a larger foreign debt or smaller capital stock.  
Thirdly, the government balance equation can be written as follows:  
GGG SER  ,         (4.10) 
 with Gj
j
jG CPE  ,         (4.11) 
 
where GR  is government revenue, GE  is government spending, GS  is government 
savings, GC  is government consumption and jP  is the price vector of government 
consumption goods.  
Government balance depends on the financing options used. The 
government closure calls for social assistance transfers to be financed by a 
reduction of funds available for other activities in the economy. We are keeping a 
balanced government deficit in all financing options. This helps to reduce some of 
the long term side effects of a large budget deficit such as inflation, high interest 
rates and the crowding out of private investment.  The key government closure is 
subdivided into two different closure rules, each characterized by the flexibilit y of 
one tax scaling factor, while keeping the other fixed. In the first option all 
government items are fixed except for direct taxes to institutions. In the second 
option, commodity taxes are flexible. Government balance is held fixed in all two 
options. 
Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors, and is segmented by 
skill. Capital is fixed and fully employed, so the capital return is the equilibrating 
variable. Labor supply is endogenous and unemployment is present in every labor 
market segment. Both labor market employment and wages can vary after a shock. 
Labor market closure is made per type of labor, rather than per sector.  
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4.2.2 CGE Model version 2 
The second CGE version differs only in terms of the closure rules, as explained in 
Section 4.2 before. CGE model (version 2) will be used for the linked TD-BU 
model. In this second version, we initially fix marginal propensity to save (which 
was flexible in the first version of the model) and then relax it later when we 
changed the hypothesis of the CGE model in order to make it fully determined 
(details of which will be given in the empirical section). Savings follows from 
fixed consumption and variable income and then investment in turn follows from 
savings.  Lastly, in this version, labor supply and demand functions are exogenous, 
being taken from the MS model.  
4.3  Microsimulation model 
 
In this section we give a detailed description of the microsimulation model, which 
includes both the discrete choice model and the tax-benefit model. Here we will 
explain the basic model, while the details of the tax-benefit model will be given in 
Appendix A. 
4.3.1 Basic microsimulation model 
The model is a behavioral model which includes a discrete labor participation 
model and a detailed tax-benefit model. It closely follows that of Colombo (2010). 
The main difference is that given the topic under consideration, we have included 
a detailed tax benefit module. In addition the household expenditure system is 
modeled by a linear expenditure demand system, rather than a Cobb Douglas 
demand system. This was done mainly to increase the degree of heterogeneity 
between households
23
. The model can be summarized by the following main 
equations: 
       
                                                                                          ,  (4.13) 
                                                 
23
 Linear expenditure demand system can accommodate non-unitary elasticities of demand and also allows 
for the representation of subsistence or minimum consumption. Savard (2010) argued that LES allows for 
the introduction of greater household heterogeneity by means of marginal budget shares, which can be 
household specific, unlike the Cobb Douglas demand system.  
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               ,                (4.14) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                           ,       (4.15)      
hqjh
j
jhqhqhqhqq
PEPCP    )( *** ,     (4. 16) 
where subscripts are defined as follows:  
h  denotes households, 
*h denotes racial groups of households
24
 ,   
q  denotes categories of goods,     
i  denote individual members of household h  and  
j denote all other goods. 
 
Real disposable income
25
, hYRD (Equation 4.13) is calculated by subtracting 
taxes from total income and dividing by a household specific price index ( hCPI ), 
and subtracting income taxes
26
. hiLW  is log of wage earnings of individual i  of 
household h , hYK  is capital income of household h , hE  is household expenditure, 
hGT   is government social assistance transfers and hTR  represents all other 
transfers (includes net transfer to rest of the world and net inter-household 
transfers). 
Equation 4.14 is the wage earnings equation, where log of wage 
earnings )( hiLW  of individual i , of household h , is assumed to depend on a vector 
of observable personal or individual characteristics ( hiX
' )
 
and unobservable 
factor )( hiu . The participation or selection equation (Equation 4.15) is a binomial 
probit model, which consists of a vector of observable characteristics, hiV
'
 and 
                                                 
24
 The LES estimation was done separately for different racial groups, hence both marginal budget shares 
and minimum expenditure differ per racial group (see detailed explanation and results in Appendix C. 
25
 Real disposable income is needed for inequality and poverty analysis. 
26
 Tax was calculated from the tax module (we applied South African tax rules and regulations to calculate 
respective household taxes). See next chapter for a detailed description of the tax module. 
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unobservable part hi . The vector of observable part hiV
'  consists of different 
individual characteristics together with disposable predicted wage rate  (see 
Appendix B for a detailed description of variables included) .  
Household consumption expenditure is modeled by a linear expenditure 
system, where the demand function (Equation 4.16) is the sum of the minimal ( q ) 
and discretionary components (what is in the parenthesis). 
Income variables in Equation 4.13 are derived by summing up individual 
data for all members of each household. For example, capital income of household 
h  ( hYK ) is calculated as follows:  
 



N
i
hih YKYK
1
,         (4.17) 
where N is total number of household members .     
      
Capital income for each household is calculated by multiplying capital stock of 
each household by the return on capital PK  as follows: 
 
hh KSPKYK * .         (4.18) 
        
Initial values of both capital stock ( KS ) and labor endowment ( L ) are obtained 
from survey data, making use of the working assumption that all prices and returns 
are equal to one at the benchmark. Household specific consumer price index 
( CPI ) is derived by multiplying household consumption shares hq  by the price 
level ( qP ): 
 
q
n
q
hqh PCPI *
1


  ,         (4.19) 
 
where 
h
qq
hq
E
CP *
 .         (4.20) 
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Savings of household h ( hS ) are assumed to be a fixed share of household 
disposable income hYD , as follows: 
 
hhh YDmpsS * ,         (4.21) 
where hYD  is defined as follows: 
 
.* hhh CPIYRDYD           (4.22) 
 
To get marginal propensity to save, the initial data from the survey were used as 
follows:  
 
h
h
h YD
S
mps  .                  (4.23) 
 
Household consumption budgets were derived by subtracting savings from 
disposable income:   
 
hhh SYDE  .                 (4.24) 
From the MS model three equations will be estimated: the log earnings equation, 
the selection equation and the LES equation. Estimation details for these equations will 
be given in Chapter 5.  
4.4 CGE-Microsimulation model 
 
The present work relies on a bi-directional (top-down, bottom-up) model similar in 
many respect to that of Savard (2003) and Bourguignon and Savard (2008). In this 
part of the model CGE version 2 (as explained in Section 4.2.2) will be used. The 
model differs from that of Savard (2003) in that we included a detailed tax 
module. Figure 4.3 gives a summary of the model. 
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Figure 4.3: Linked CGE-Microsimulation model 
Source: Savard, 2003 with some modifications. 
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supply vectors. After the first run, price changes were fed into the MS model as 
follows:  
 
])[(
1 m
hhh
m
h
m
hm
h
m
h taxesGTTRYKYL
CPI
YRD  ,    (4.25) 
  
                                                     ,      (4.26) 
 
 
All variables are defined as before, superscript m  on all variables denotes variable 
at iteration m . In addition vectors mP  and mw  at iteration m  and are calculated as 
follows:  
  
qCGE
mm
q PP 1 ,        (4.27) 
                                               
    .        (4.28) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
The MS model generates commodity demand and labor supply vectors 
which are weighted by inverse probability weights
27
 and aggregated and then 
transferred as inputs to the CGE model, where they will be exogenous. For 
example aggregated consumption at iteration m  is calculated as follows: 
 
            h
h
m
hqh
m HCWConsAgg . ,      (4.29) 
 
where hW  represents weights, hqC  is consumption and hH  is total number of 
households per group. The CGE model then determines a temporary equilibrium 
which is consistent with the predetermined level of consumption and labor supply 
variables. New price changes (
11,   mmq wP ) will again be calculated in the CGE 
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 The probabilities are survey participation probabilities. 
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model, which will be fed back to the MS model. The iteration continues until the 
difference between the two consecutive iterations are close to zero. In the first run 
of the CGE model both consumption and labor supply are endogenous and in the 
second CGE model these variables are made exogenous. This was mainly done in 
the CGE model in order to reproduce behavior which we have in the MS model 
(since both consumption and labor supply are endogenous in the MS model) in 
order to facilitate convergence. After the first run the hypotheses of the CGE 
model were changed to make it fully determined. Firstly, the consumption demand 
equations were removed in the CGE model, and replaced by the following 
equation: 
 
   ,        (4.30) 
 
where total expenditure ( HE ) is defined as the sum of the product of prices and 
quantities of all commodities. Secondly, the leisure demand equation was removed 
from the CGE model and labor supply was made exogenous in the CGE model. 
Following Savard (2003), marginal propensity to save was endogenized in order to 
ensure balance of the household budget.  
The linked model can take into account full agent heterogeneity and 
consider feedback effects that arise from endogenizing prices in the CGE model. 
The two models should be regarded as complements. The CGE model, unlike the 
MS model, does not fully account for heterogeneity of household behavior and it 
assumes that intra-group variance is zero. On the other hand the MS model is a 
partial equilibrium model, which does not account for general equilibrium effects. 
The main role of the MS module in a linked framework is to provide a detailed 
computation of net incomes at the household level through a detailed description 
of the tax-benefit system of the economy, and to estimate individual behavioral 
responses to policy change.  
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CHAPTER 5  
IMPUTATION, ESTIMATION AND CALIBRATION OF 
PARAMETERS  
This chapter deals with the estimation, imputation and calibration of model 
parameters. The first section introduces the data sources. The second section gives 
imputation of taxes and social assistance. The third section shows how the discrete 
labor supply parameters have been derived, while the last section gives the 
estimation and calibration of the linear expenditure system.  
 
5.1 Data Sources 
5.1.1 Microsimulation dataset 
 
For purposes of the model estimation and simulation we used a merged South 
African Income and Expenditure Household Survey (IES) and Labor Force Survey 
(LFS) for the year 2000. The two datasets were prepared at the same time, with the 
same respondents interviewed, so the two could be merged.  The IES was used as 
the primary data set, since it contains detailed information on household income 
and expenditures required for tax and benefit calculations. The LFS provides 
detailed employment information for individual members at working age and also 
the relationships of household members. The LFS was used as the main source of 
demographic and employment data.  The year 2000 was used as the base year for 
two main reasons. Firstly, the social accounting matrix (SAM) is also for that 
particular year; this is important since we intend to merge the two models (the 
CGE and microsimulation models). Secondly, it is mainly in this particular year 
where the two surveys were conducted at the same time, which makes it possible 
to merge the two surveys and get a detailed dataset needed for the tax and benefit 
model.  
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In order to adjust and correct for data inconsistencies, we closely followed 
work which was done by the ‘Provide’ project (see Pauw, 2005). Raw data came in 
‘The American Standard Code for Information Interchange’ (ASC11) fixed width 
text files. Different dictionaries were created and used to read data into STATA, 
and various do-files were used to extract, correct, merge and impute missing data 
(see Pauw (2005) for a detailed explanation of how it was carried out). After all 
necessary adjustments, data was then mapped into different income and 
expenditure groups according to what we have in the social accounting matrix.  
5.1.2 CGE data set 
We used a South African Social Accounting Matrix that was developed by 
Thurlow and van Seventer (2002) under the auspices of the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in order to capture the base year structure of the 
South African economy. The original SAM consists of 43 sectors, 14 household 
types, government sector, enterprise and the rest of the world. In this study, an 
aggregated version of this SAM that includes five sectors, four factors of 
production and 64 household groups is used. Table 5.1 gives the schematic of the 
social accounting matrix used.  
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Table 5.1: Schematic structure of the social accounting matrix (SAM) for South Africa 
  Activities 
(1) 
Commodities 
(2) 
Factors 
(3) 
Household 
(HH) (4) 
Enterprise 
(Ent) (5) 
Government 
(Govt) (6) 
Sav- 
Inv (7) 
ROW 
(8) 
Total 
Activities  
(1) 
 Marketed 
output 
      Activity 
income 
Commodities 
(2) 
Intermediat
e demand 
Transaction 
costs 
 Household 
consumption 
 Government 
consumption 
Inv Exports Total 
demand 
Factors (3) Value added       Factor inc Factor inc 
Households 
(HH) (4) 
  Factor inc 
to HH 
Inter-household 
transfer 
Surplus to 
HH dividends 
Gov transfers 
to HH 
 Transfer   
to HH 
HH 
income 
Enterprise 
(Ent)(5) 
  Factor inc 
to Ent 
  Transfer to 
enterprise 
 Transfer to 
enterprise 
Ent 
income 
Government 
(Govt) 
(6) 
Activity 
taxes 
Commodity 
taxes 
Factor inc 
to Govt 
Personal 
income tax 
corporate  tax   ROW 
Transfer to 
Govt 
Govt 
income 
Savings-
Investment 
(7) 
   Household 
savings 
Enterprise 
savings 
Government 
savings 
 Foreign 
savings 
Savings 
Rest of the 
world (8) 
 Imports Factor 
income to 
ROW 
 Surplus to 
ROW 
Transfer to 
ROW 
  Foreign 
outflows 
Total Activity Supply 
expenditure 
Factor 
expenditure 
Household 
expenditure 
Enterprise 
exp 
Government 
expenditure 
Inv Foreign 
inflow 
 
Source: Lofgren, 2002. 
Note: “Sav” is savings, “Inv” is investment, inc is income and “ROW” is rest of the world.
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The disaggregated social accounting matrix includes five sectors (activities) 
and five commodities, grouped as follows: 
 Agriculture–which consists of agriculture, mining and textiles as follows: 
agriculture, fishing, forestry, gold, coal, other mining, textiles, apparel, 
leather and footwear, referred to as agri. 
 Food–comprising food, beverages and tobacco, referred to as food. 
 Manufacturing–comprising manufacturing, petroleum and vehicle as 
follows: paper products, printing, rubber, plastic, glass, non-metal mineral 
products, iron, non-ferrous metals, machinery, electric machinery, 
communication equipment, scientific equipment, other industries, wood, 
metal products, furniture, petroleum, vehicles and transport equipment 
referred to as manf. 
 Capital Goods–comprising electricity, water, construction, basic chemicals 
and other chemicals referred to as capg. 
 Services–comprising wholesale, trade, hotels and accommodation, transport 
services, communication, finance and insurance, business services, medical 
and other services, other producers and government services, referred to as 
serv.  
The social accounting matrix identifies four factors of production: highly 
skilled labor (Labhi), skilled labor (Labmed), unskilled labor (Lablo) and capital. 
Table 5.2 gives detailed categories of labor according to different occupations . 
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Table 5.2: Description of labor categories 
Labor category    Occupation categories    
Highly skilled      Professional, legislators, senior officials,  
technical, managerial and administrative 
occupations 
 
Skilled      Clerical, sales, transport, skilled agricultural  
and fishery workers, service workers, craft 
and production workers 
 
Unskilled      Elementary, domestic workers and all other  
      unspecified occupations   
Source: Own table  
 
All labor categories are assumed mobile across sectors and wages are 
crucial for income distribution. Unlike in the IFPRI SAM, where households are 
identified according to income level (an endogenous variable in the model), in this 
thesis households are classified taking into account exogenous characteristic of the 
representative groups. This was done mainly because households could be mobile 
between income groups. Hence in this thesis we have disaggregated households 
according to social characteristics such as race, location, gender, education and 
income level of household head, as shown on Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Disaggregation of households 
Repres-
entative 
group 
(Rhg) 
Race Location Gender  Educati
on 
Level 
  Income 
Level 
 African Whites Asians Colored Urban Rural Male Fe   L H    L H 
1 ✓    ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓  
2 ✓    ✓  ✓   ✓  ✓ 
3 ✓    ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
4 ✓    ✓  ✓  ✓   ✓ 
5 ✓    ✓   ✓  ✓ ✓  
6 ✓    ✓   ✓  ✓  ✓ 
7 ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  
8 ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ 
9 ✓     ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  
10 ✓     ✓ ✓   ✓  ✓ 
11 ✓     ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓  
12 ✓     ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓ 
13 ✓     ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓  
14 ✓     ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
15 ✓     ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  
16 ✓     ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Source: Own diagram. 
Note: 1. L denotes low income households, H denotes high income households and Fe denotes  
 female.  
         2. The same level of aggregation applies for the other three racial groups (whites, Asians   
             and Coloreds) which gives a total of 64 household groups. 
 
For example the first representative household groups will be:  
Rhg1-Urban African, male headed, high educated and low income households. 
 
Some household groups were dropped since they did not have enough 
households (see Table E.1 in the Appendix E for details). Disaggregating 
households according to racial groups was mainly driven by the South African 
history; during the apartheid era there were large differences in income level s of 
different racial groups. Educational levels were used in order to capture the skill 
dimension. Evidence in South Africa suggests a high correlation between 
education and employment status (Bhorat et al., 1999).   
We have used the Income and Expenditure Survey of 2000 and the Labor 
Force Survey of September 2000 to form these household groups (the same data 
set used for the MS model). Expenditure items were grouped into the following 
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groups: commodities, inter-household transfer payments, income taxes, household 
savings, and household transfers to the rest of the world. Commodities were first 
grouped into 96 groups according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), 
and later on aggregated into 5 groups (as described before). Income items were 
grouped into the following groups, again according to what we have in the social 
accounting matrix: labor income, capital income, income from government 
transfers, household transfer income, and household transfer income from rest of 
the world. To calculate the actual figures for respective household income and 
expenditure items, the aggregate household items from the standard social 
accounting matrix were used as control totals in order to ensure consistency. 
Finally, the RAS technique was used to balance the SAM. This technique produces 
a new transaction matrix that is consistent with new row and column totals by 
reciprocally adjusting row and column totals proportionately. This technique was 
found to be appropriate in this case of starting with an older SAM, since it 
assumes the SAM is consistent. Table 5.4a gives the numeric aggregated social 
accounting matrix for South Africa. 
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Table 5.4a: Numeric aggregated SAM for South Africa  
R'm Act Com TC Lab Cap Firms HH 
Act - 1 616 976.10 - - - - - 
Com 808 589.11 - 155 804.00 - - - 556 506.94 
TC - 155 804.00 - - - - - 
Lab 424 958.54 - - - - - - 
Cap 363 293.65 - - - - - - 
Firms - - -    - 335 386.08 - - 
HH - -   - 423 214.86 - 206 168.66 - 
Gov - - - - 7 659.21 572.30 846.69 
Tax 20 188.80 79 994.00 - - - 28 444.64 99 125.36 
S-I - - - -  - 151 583.20 3 122.31 
Dstk - - - - - - - 
Row - 229 717.92 - 1 743.68 3 5749.22 81.70 117.18 
Total 1 616 976.10 208 249 2.02 155 804.00 424 958.54 378 794.51 386 850.51 659 718.47 
 
SAM continued… 
 
R'm Gov Tax S-I Dstk Row Total 
Act - - - - - 1 616 976.10 
Com 166 293.04      - 132 016.42 4 011.69 259 270.82 2 082 492.02 
TC - - - - - 155 804.00 
Lab - - - - - 424 958.54 
Cap - - - - 15 554.86 378 794.51 
Firms 51 464.43      - - - - 386 850.51 
HH 30 080.79     - - - 254.16 659 718.47 
Gov - 227 752.80 - - 473.23 237 304.23 
Tax -          - - - - 227 752.80 
S-I -17 311.57     - - - -1 365.83 136 028.12 
Dstk -          - 4 011.69 - - 4 011.69 
Row 6 777.55    - - - - 274 187.25 
Total 237 304.23 227 752.80 136 028.12 4 011.69 274 187.25  
Source: Thurlow, 2005. 
Note: Abbreviations used in the SAM are described in Table 5.4b below. 
 
Table 5.4b: Description of variables used in the social accounting matrix (SAM) 
Variable    Description       
Act     Activities 
Com     Commodities 
TC     Transaction costs 
Lab     Labor 
Cap     Capital 
Firms     Firms 
HH     Representative households (aggregated) 
Gov     Government 
Tax     Taxes (all taxes aggregated) 
S-I     Savings-investment balance 
Dstk     Stock 
Row     rest of the world 
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5.1.3  Other data inputs  
A number of additional data inputs were necessary to calibrate or initialize the 
model. Trade elasticities data for the Armington and transformation functions and 
substitution elasticities between factors of production (bottom of technology) were 
taken from Thurlow (2002). Wage curve elasticities, were taken from Kingdom 
and Knight (1999).Table 5.5 gives a list of all model parameters and data sources. 
Table 5.5: Model parameters 
Parameter Value Data Source 
Trade elasticity- Armington elasticity: 
c_agri 
c_food 
c_manf 
c_capg 
c_services 
 
2.191 
1.535 
2.372 
1.014 
0.643 
 
 
Thurlow,2002 
Trade elasticity- Constant elasticity of 
transformation: 
2.000 Thurlow,2002 
Elasticity of substitution between factors: 
i_agri 
i_food 
i_manf 
i_capg 
i_services 
 
0.450 
0.166 
0.337 
0.500 
0.500 
 
 
Thurlow,2002 
 
Output aggregation elasticity for 
commodity: 
4.000 Thurlow,2002 
Household consumption expenditure 
elasticities: 
c_agri 
 
c_food 
 
c_manf 
 
c_capg 
 
c_services 
 
 
 
Low income: 0.935 
High income:1.622 
Low income: 0.627 
High income: 1.044 
Low income: 1.462 
High income: 0.809 
Low income: 1.266 
High income: 1.532 
Low income: 1.909 
High income: 0.788 
 
 
 
 
 
From own estimation 
Elasticity of labor supply with respect to 
income 
0.120 Annabi, 2003 
Frisch parameters for household LES 
demand 
Low income: 1.489 
High income: 1.032 
From own estimation 
Unemployment rates: 
Labhi 
Labmed 
Lablo 
 
0.179 
0.219 
0.259 
 
Wage curve elasticity:  
Labhi 
Labmed 
Lablo 
 
-0.112 
-0.115 
-0.117 
 
 
Kingdom and Knight, 1999 
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5.2 Imputation of tax benefit module variables 
South African tax rules were applied to taxable income after making respective 
deductions, in order to calculate taxes. We also imputed social assistance transfers 
(assistance) in the model. Detailed explanation of how taxes and social assistance 
transfers were calculated or imputed and a comparison of imputed results and 
official statistics are given in Appendix A.  
 
5.3 Estimation of model parameters 
From the MS model, presented in Section 4.3 before, three equations need to be 
estimated. These include the wage earnings equation (Equation 4.14), the selection model 
equation (Equation 4.15) and the linear expenditure system (Equation 4.16). The wage 
earnings equation was estimated using a Heckman two-step model, in order to 
correct for sample selection bias, stemming from the fact that we only observe a 
positive wage for individuals who were working at the time of the survey. The 
selection equation was estimated separately using maximum likelihood techniques. 
Estimation of these two equations was done on a subsample comprising only those 
at working age that is 16 to 64 years. Estimation was done separately for two 
demographic groups, single individuals and married couples. Detailed estimation 
procedures and results for the wage earnings equation and selection model are presented 
in Appendix B. 
In order to replicate the observed labor market statuses given in the survey 
for the base year period, we used a calibration method which follows that of 
Duncan and Weeks (1998) and Bourguignon et al. (2003). This approach exploits 
the fact that we have information about choices of individual households in the 
initial situation, which can be used to transform utility evaluations of disposable 
income into conditional probabilities. The procedure requires drawing error terms 
for each individual from the normal distribution. Only 100 error terms which 
retain observed labor market choices after adding them to the deterministic part 
were selected. Hence error terms were chosen in such a way that:  
0'  hihihi V  ,         (5.1) 
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for all those observed to be working in the survey and vice versa for those not 
working. These residuals are kept constant in all simulations and only the 
deterministic part changes. The approach gives individual probabilities of 
choosing between two alternatives. The main advantage of the approach is that it 
makes use of most information in the initial dataset, including actual choices of 
individuals.  
We used demographic translating
28
 in order to introduce demographic 
variables into the linear expenditure system. STATA’s NLSUR command was used 
in order to estimate all five commodity equations simultaneously while accounting 
for the possibility of correlated errors as values of the different expenditure 
categories were collected from the same set of households. Estimation of the linear 
expenditure system was done separately for different racial groups. Appendix C 
presents estimation procedures and results of the linear expenditure system.  
 
5.4 Calibration of LES parameters for the CGE model 
5.4.1 CGE version 1 
 
Version 1 of the CGE model
29
 has an endogenous labor supply model. From before 
(Section 4.2.1.2) maximization of a Stone-Geary utility function yielded Equations 
4.6 and 4.7. The resulting demand functions are the sum of minimal and 
discretionary consumption (which is in parenthesis). Discretionary or 
supernumerary income represents income available after satisfaction of minimal 
consumption. From the maximization problem one derives consumer demand and 
leisure demand. To get the labor supply function we employed the fact that, total 
available time ( T ) is equal to working time ( LS ) plus leisure time ( l ), that is: 
lLST   , which implies that lTLS   and also the fact that total income ( Y ) is  
                                                 
28
 According to Pollak and Wales (1981), demographic translating means allowing necessary or 
subsistence parameters of a demand system to depend on demographic variables. This differs from 
demographic scaling Barten (1964), where a demand system is modified in order to incorporate commodity 
specific adult equivalent scales (Pollak and Wales (1981)).  
29
 See section 4.2 for a detailed explanation of why we are using different versions of the CGE model. 
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equal to labor income plus non-labor income ( y ). With a few manipulations we 
get the following consumer demand and labor supply equations
30
: 
 
,
1








 
j
HjjH
q
Hq
HqHq PY
P
C 


      (5.2) 
 








  
H H j
HjjH PY
w
LSLS 


)1(
max  .    (5.3) 
Where now, HY represents total income and
minmax lTLS  . 
We followed the calibration method proposed by Dervis et al . (1982), 
which consists of selecting income elasticities of demand, income elasticity of 
labor supply and Frisch parameters outside the model and calibrating the minimum 
expenditures and marginal budget shares parameter that will balance out the 
household’s budget constraint. In the model we used income elasticity of demand 
and Frisch parameters from the estimated linear expenditure demand system before 
(see Tables E.3 and E.4 in Appendix E).  
Firstly, we used income elasticities of labor supply ( LS ) to solve for share 
of leisure ( ). Income elasticity of labor supply ( LS ) is calculated as follows, 
from the labor supply Equation 5.3 given before:  
 
LS
Y
wLS
Y
Y
LS
LS
)1( 






 ,       (5.4) 
where 
H
HYY . 
 
Solving for leisure shares ,  
Y
LSwLS



1
 .         (5.5) 
 
                                                 
30
 For detailed derivations see Annabi, 2003. 
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Secondly, we used income elasticities of demand ( yq ) to solve for marginal 
budget shares ( q ). Income elasticity of demand is calculated as follows, from the 
LES Equation 5.2 before:  
 
Hq
H
q
Hq
Hq
H
H
Hq
yq
C
Y
PC
Y
Y
C
)1( 






 .       (5.6) 
      
Solving for marginal budget shares Hq  ,  
H
Hqq
yqHq
Y
CP)1( 


  .        (5.7) 
To solve for minimum expenditure ( Hq ) we used Frisch parameters, which 
is the negative of ratio of total expenditure to discretionary expenditure. Initially 
solve for Hq  from the consumption expenditure Equation 5.2 before to get: 








 
j
HjjH
q
Hq
HqHq PY
P
C 



)1(
.      (5.8) 
But we know that Frisch is given as the negative of the ratio between income or 
expenditure and discretionary income or expenditure. 


j
HjjH
H
H
PY
Y
Frisch

.                 (5.9a) 
This implies that: 
H
H
j
HjjH
Frisch
Y
PY   .              (5.9b) 
Substituting Equation 5.9b, in Equation 5.8 we get: 







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H
H
q
Hq
HqHq
Frisch
Y
P
C
)1( 

 .       (5.10) 
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5.4.2 CGE version 2 
In the CGE version 2, labor supply is fixed
31
. Household consumption expenditure 
was modeled by a linear expenditure demand system(Equation 4.16).We again 
followed the calibration method proposed by Dervis et al . (1982), which consists 
of selecting income elasticities and Frisch parameters outside the model and 
calibrating the Hq and Hq  parameters that will balance out the household’s budget 
constraint. We again used income elasticity from the estimated LES function in the 
MS model, for calibration purposes. Firstly, we used income elasticities of demand 
( yq ) to solve for marginal budget shares ( Hq ). Income elasticity of demand is 
calculated as follows, from the LES Equation 4.16 (after dividing by Pq 
throughout) before.  
 
Hq
H
q
Hq
Hq
H
H
Hq
yq
C
Y
PC
Y
Y
C
**

 


 .       (5.11) 
      
Solving for marginal budget shares Hq  ,  
H
Hqq
yqHq
Y
CP
*  .         (5.12) 
To solve for minimum expenditure ( Hq ) we used Frisch parameters, which 
is the negative of the ratio of total expenditure to discretionary expenditure; 
initially solve for Hq  from the consumer demand Equation 4.16 before to get: 






 
j
HjjH
q
Hq
HqHq PY
P
C 

 .       (5.13) 
 But we know that Frisch is given as the negative of the ratio between 
income or expenditure and discretionary income or expenditure. 


j
HjjH
H
H
PY
Y
Frisch

.        (5.14) 
                                                 
31
 Since it was taken from the MS model. 
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Substituting the Frisch parameter in Equation 5.14 above and factoring out 
(
q
H
P
Y
), we get: 







H
Hq
H
Hqq
q
H
Hq
FrischY
CP
P
Y 
 .       (5.15) 
 
The calibration procedure explained above results in household specific 
minimum expenditure ( Hq ) and marginal budget shares ( Hq ), hence the resulting 
consumption demand functions will not aggregate perfectly. The linear 
expenditure consumption demand system will only aggregate perfectly when 
marginal budget shares ( Hq ) are equal for all households (see Cogneau and 
Robilliard, 2007). This result is known in literature as Gorman aggregation result. 
Gorman (1953) considers the question ‘under what condition can individual 
preference be aggregated so that aggregate demand functions act as if they were 
derived from a single individual preference?’ He concluded that this will be 
possible if, and only if consumer demand functions are linear with the same slope 
as follows.  
 
iiii YPBPAX )()(  ,        (5.16) 
where  iY  represent income, )(PAi  represents the intercept and )(PBi  is the slope. 
Demand curves will only aggregate perfectly if )(PB i , the slope (marginal 
budget shares in our case), is constant for all individuals. That is, exact linear 
aggregation condition requires households to have parallel linear Engel curves, 
which implies that households would spend the same share of their excess budget 
on each commodity at every point of their income distribution.  
We did not make marginal budget shares equal for all households, since 
choosing the same marginal budget shares will not balance out the household’s 
budget constraint. As previously stated, we selected income elasticities and Frisch 
parameters outside the model and calibrated minimum expenditure and marginal 
 55 
budget shares parameters which are household specific in order to balance out the 
households’ budget constraint. 
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CHAPTER 6  
RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
In the first part (Section 6.1) of this chapter the analysis will be done using only 
the CGE model since we want to fully explain what happens in the CGE model as 
we increase social assistance transfers to poor households before we link the two 
models (CGE and MS models). In addition we also want to incorporate more 
household heterogeneity in the CGE model, by considering more household groups 
(64 household groups) which were disaggregated according to exogenous 
household characteristics
32
. In the second part of this chapter (Section 6.2) we will 
then apply a linked top-down, bottom-up model and consider only two 
representative household groups. Lastly, in the final part of the chapter we will do 
a comparative analysis of the TD-BU model and the MS-only model.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
6.1 CGE model 
6.1.1 Policy experiments 
 
In the analysis here, we use the CGE version 1 model which was explained in 
Section 4.2.1. We double social assistance transfers to low income households in 
our simulations (those whose income is below 40% of total gross income).  In 
order to balance the government budget, we experiment with two different 
financing options.  
 
Option 1: Direct taxes to households and firms.  
Option 2: Increase in commodity taxes. 
6.1.2 Simulation results 
Table 6.1 gives a summary of changes in macroeconomic variables following an increase 
in social assistance transfers to low income households under the two afore-mentioned 
                                                 
32
 This may be more demanding in our linked model since the iteration between the two models is done 
manually at this stage.  
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different financing options. The discussion will be done per each financing option after 
the table.  
Table 6.1: Simulation Results 
Variable     Transfers financed by: 
               Direct taxes   Commodity Tax 
     (Option 1) (%)   (Option 2) (%) 
 
 
Absorption    0.028     -1.086 
Private Consumption   0.044     -1.676 
Private Inv    -------      ------- 
Government Cons   -------                ------- 
Exports    0.161     -0.888 
Imports    0.182     -1.003 
CPI     0.002      1.425 
Exchange rate 
(LCU per FCU)            -0.045      0.198 
Factor returns: 
Unskilled labor    0.090     -0.587 
Skilled labor             -0.017     -0.900 
Highly skilled labor            -0.033     -1.092 
Capital              -0.005     -4.872 
Unemployment: 
Unskilled labor            -0.745      5.160 
Skilled labor     0.166      8.216 
Highly skilled labor    0.315              10.302 
Labor supply: 
Unskilled labor            -0.017               -1.144 
Skilled labor             -0.005               -1.108 
Highly skilled labor            -0.004               -1.086 
Note: “cons” is consumption, “inv” is investment and “CPI” is consumer price index. 
Exchange rate is expressed in terms of local currency unit (LCU) per foreign currency unit (FCU). 
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Option 1  
Macroeconomic results for option 1 are given in the first column of Table 6.1.  For 
this option, direct tax to households and firms is considered as an endogenous 
variable and adjusted to levels required to finance social assistance transfers to 
low income households (those whose income is below 40% of total gross income). 
As a first round effect an increase in social assistance transfers causes a 
corresponding increase in income for low income households . This will induce an 
increase in demand for commodities consumed in higher proportion by low income 
households, for example agricultural and food products
33
. Production levels of 
items such as agriculture and food have witnessed an increase in their supply (see 
Table E.2 in the Appendix E).  
In addition there is a second round effect, stemming from the following 
reasons; firstly, increased commodity prices in the economy led to a higher 
consumer price index, which lowers real income of all households. Secondly, 
firms respond to an increase in consumer demand by increasing production of 
commodities which are demanded in higher proportion by low income households.  
Since these commodities make use of a relatively high percentage of low skilled 
labor, there would be an increase in employment of unskilled labor and an increase 
in factor returns for unskilled labor (0.090%); thereby further increasing incomes 
of low income households, as they derive their factor income mainly from 
unskilled labor. A decrease in employment of high skilled income is mainly due to 
a fall in the output of sectors that produce goods using highly skilled technologies 
(for example capital goods). This follows a decrease in consumption of these 
commodities by high income households who mainly demand them. Thirdly, in 
order to maintain a balanced budget deficit the government will increase direct 
taxes on domestic institutions, which decreases levels of disposable income and 
partially offset increases in consumption. To maintain a progressive tax structure, 
tax rates for high income households increase by more than that for low income 
households. 
                                                 
33
 The overall impact on private consumption depends on relative MPC, as explained on the next page. 
 59 
The overall impact on private consumption depends on the relative 
marginal propensity to consume of low income households (those gaining income) 
and high income households (those losing income). If the marginal propensity to 
consume of those gaining income is higher than that of those losing income then, 
ceteris paribus, private consumption will increase. For option 1 there is an overall 
increase in private consumption of 0.044%.   
In sum, those in low income groups benefit from a rise in real income. The 
total effect on household income is positive for all those in the low income group 
and negative for all those in the high income group (see Table E.5 in Appendix E) 
Hence low income households do benefit not only from receiving transfers but 
also from indirect (second round effects) induced by expenses of their original 
transfers.  
Due to the Johansen closure (fixed investment), investment will not 
decrease following this increase in consumption by low income households, but 
instead, savings of domestic institutions should adjust to maintain a savings- 
investment balance. Exports also increase due to the increase in the total supply of 
goods and services in the economy, but since low income households spend the 
bulk of their income on domestically produced goods, imports would not increase 
much initially. This would call for a slight appreciation of nominal exchange  rate 
(by 0.045%), resulting in an increase in imports and a decrease in exports in order 
to maintain the current account balance.  
 
 
 Option 2 
Results for option 2 are given in the second column of Table 6.1. In option 2, 
commodity tax is used to finance the increase in social assistance transfers to low 
income households. To facilitate this option, the commodity tax was made 
endogenous in the CGE model and adjusted to the level required to finance social 
assistance transfers to low income households. The first round effect of an 
increase in social assistance transfers to low income households is a corresponding 
increase in their income which induces an increase in consumer demand. Second 
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round (indirect) effects stem mainly from the following reasons: Firstly, 
commodity taxes raise prices of final goods. This leads to an increase in the 
consumer price index. This has a negative impact on households ’ real income and 
thus on private consumption, hence private consumption decreases by 1.676%. 
Secondly, a decrease in consumer demand will be followed by a reduction in 
domestic production leading to rising unemployment. All factor returns decrease 
under this option, thereby causing a reduction in household incomes.  All in all, 
the net effect on income for poor households is still positive but the increase in 
real income is lower as compared to that of option 1 (see Table E.5 in Appendix 
E).   
Exports decrease mainly due to a decrease in domestic production. There is 
a decrease in absorption (of 1.086%), prompted mainly by a decrease in private 
consumption and exports.  
 
Labor supply effects  
Labor supply results are presented on Table 6.1. Overall, labor supply decreases 
for option 1. This actually highlights the fact that the substitution effect of an 
increase in tax rates dominates the income effect. Theoretically, there are two 
different issues to consider following an increase in government transfers, which 
are financed by increase in taxes. The benefit (transfer) produces a pure income 
effect, whereas the tax rate produces both income and substitution effect. Firstly, 
there is a pure income effect, stemming from the fact that an increase in 
government transfer leads to an increase in real income which will induce 
individuals to consume more leisure and work less (decrease in labor supply). 
Secondly, a lower after-tax wage rate generates two conflicting results on the labor 
supply decisions. On one hand, a decrease in the after-tax wage rate decreases the 
opportunity cost of leisure, inducing workers to substitute work for leisure, 
thereby resulting in a decrease in labor supply (substitution effect). On the other 
hand, a decrease in after-tax wage also decreases the worker’s real income, hence 
he or she will also decrease consumption of normal goods including leisure 
(income effect), leading to an increase in labor supply, thereby partially offsetting 
 61 
the pure income effect given before (stemming from an increase in non-labor 
income or government transfers). The sum of the income effect and substitution 
effect yields the net effect on labor supply.  
One of the main critiques of social assistance transfers is that they can 
interfere with incentives to work.  Both social assistance (benefits) and tax rates 
reduce work effort. The argument is that by offering an alternative to employment, 
social assistance can reduce the motivation to work which decreases labor supply 
and output. The tax rate effectively reduces the wage rate by which the worker is 
rewarded, thereby inducing people to substitute work for leisure. In addition 
means tested social assistance can also reduce incentives to work by requiring 
beneficiaries and their spouses to fall below a certain income threshold.  
We have very minor reductions in labor supply for option 1, highlighting 
the fact that social assistance do not provide major disincentive to work. Smaller 
reductions in labor supply could be explained by the fact that part of the effects on 
working hours may be delayed (Lindbeck, 1994), or that the changes in real non 
labor income are smaller to generate major changes in labor supply ( Imbens et al., 
1999). On the other hand labor supply for option 2 (where social assistance 
transfers are financed by increases in commodity tax) decreases significantly, 
highlighting that the pure income effect resulting from an increase in  social 
assistance transfers dominates the income effect from a reduction in after-tax wage 
rate. For option 2 real incomes of households decrease a lot due to more drastic 
decrease in factor returns and higher increases in the consumer price index, 
compared to the other option. 
 
6.1.3 Poverty and inequality analysis 
 
In general, CGE models do not take into account patterns of income distribution 
within a particular household group. Hence within group variation is assumed to 
be zero. Two approaches are available in order to specify within group 
distribution: either by use of probability distributions like lognormal or beta 
distributions; which assume that the mean of the income distribution is 
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endogenously determined while its variance is specified exogenously, or by using 
disaggregated household survey data. In this study, we generate the size 
distribution by feeding selected data into household survey data, and use this to 
generate poverty and inequality measures. In particular, we use the relative 
percentage changes of representative households’ income from the CGE model to 
scale survey observations on individual household total income.  
Since the general equilibrium model framework allows endogenization of  
relative prices, the change in the monetary poverty line during each simulation can 
be endogenized within the CGE model (see Decaluwé et al., 1999). In this study we 
use a modified version of this approach, where an exogenous poverty line is used, 
and after each simulation the new monetary poverty line is computed by taking 
into account changes in the consumer price index as follows.  
 
  PIzzs *0 ,         (6.1) 
 
where sz  is a new poverty line and 0z  is a poverty line before simulation and PI is 
the new price index.  
For poverty and inequality analysis, we use adjusted total income figures or 
equivalized income which takes into account differences in size and structure of 
household, as explained in Section 2.1.1. We used this equivalence scale 
throughout the thesis.  This equivalence scale is calculated as follows: 
 
 )( KAE  ,         (6.2) 
 
where E is an adult equivalence scale, A is the number of adults in the household, 
 is a fraction representation of children ( K ) in adult equivalized scale and θ is a 
scale parameter (capturing economies of scale). Woolard and Leibbrandt (2001) 
suggested that  is 0.5 and θ is 0.9 for South Africa. 
We use the Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) index for poverty analysis. For 
details of this poverty measure see Appendix D. Table 6.2 presents poverty 
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measures for different financing options. The first column relates to the 
benchmark scenario, while the two adjacent columns relate to the two policy 
experiments. Within each column the FGT indices with  = 0,  = 1 and  = 2 are 
provided. Option 1 (where transfers are financed by an increase in income tax) 
gives a higher reduction in poverty head count than option 2 (where transfers are 
financed through an increase in commodity taxes).  Option 1 offers a higher 
reduction in poverty, mainly because it taxes those in the high income group more 
than those in the low income group. So the income of low income households is 
slightly reduced due to taxation unlike what is the case with option 2. This helps to 
push them (low income households) above the poverty line, following an increase 
in government transfers. On the other hand, option 2 offers a lower poverty 
reduction mainly because commodity taxes are levied on all products, which affect 
all household groups in the same way. So it is not only those in the high income 
group who bear most of the cost of financing the government transfers.  
 
Table 6.2: FGT Poverty measure (using R322 /month as poverty line) 
Variable Original income (%)    Option 1(%)                   Option 2(%) 
P0  29.730              25.630    26.350 
P1  12.240      9.820    10.140 
      P2          6.803                      5.300           5.480 
Note: R322/ month was a lower threshold poverty line for the year 2000 as given by Statistics 
South Africa. 
 
Table 6.3 gives inequality measures for different financing options.  The 
first column relates to the benchmark scenario, while the two next columns relate 
to the two policy experiments. Within each column two different inequal ity 
measures are provided. The decrease in inequality is slightly more for option 1, 
where direct taxes increase than for option 2, since option 1 directly attacks those 
in the high income group by taxing those more in order to transfer to those in the 
low income group. While the other option (option 2 where transfers were financed 
by an increase in commodity tax) does not directly reduce the income of high 
income households, it affects all household groups in the same way.  
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Table 6.3: Inequality measure 
Variable      Original income (%)    Option 1(%)     Option 2(%)  
Relative mean deviation 47.770   46.790    46.830 
Gini coefficient  62.610   61.300    61.340 
Note: See Appendix D for a detailed description of these inequality indices.  
 
6.2 Top-down, bottom-up model 
6.2.1 Policy experiment 
 
In this second part of the chapter, we run the same policy experiment but 
implement a linked top-down, bottom-up model. We are still considering the two 
forms of financing government transfers.  
 
Option1: Increase in direct taxes to households. 
Option 2: Increase in commodity taxes. 
6.2.2 Simulation results 
In the first option, we increased income taxes by the same amount as the increase 
in social assistance transfers to low income households. This translated to about 
19.2% increase in direct taxes. The increase in income tax was done in a 
proportional way. To maintain a progressive tax structure, tax rates for high 
income households increased by more than that of low income households, as 
illustrated in Table 6.4. The first column gives income tax rates before simulation 
and the second column gives income tax rates after simulation. 
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Table 6.4: New tax schedule 
Tax bracket Before  simulation After Simulation 
1 18 21.460 
2 26 30.990 
3 32 38.140 
4 37 44.100 
5 40 47.680 
6 42 50.060 
Note:   Own calculations. All numbers in %.  
 
  We will not concentrate much on macroeconomic variables, since it is not 
the main part of the analysis. Nevertheless, a summary of most macroeconomic 
variables is presented in Table 6.5a. The first column relates to results for option 1 
and the second column relates to results for option 2.  Macroeconomic variables 
did not differ much with the ones given in the previous section (Section 6.1.2), so 
the discussion will not be done extensively here. The major difference is in 
marginal propensity to save. We now have major changes in marginal propensity 
to save for both options (see Table 6.5b). This comes from the fact that we 
followed Savard (2003)’s suggestion of endogenizing marginal propensity to save 
in order to ensure the balance of the household budget, after making consumption 
exogenous in the CGE model.   
Comparing the two options, the main difference lies in private consumption 
and consumer price index (CPI). Private consumption decreases for option 2, while 
it increases for option 1. The consumer price index increases by a greater 
proportion for option 2. This mainly comes from the fact that the increase in 
commodity taxes raises prices of final goods, which lead to an increase in the 
consumer price index. This has a negative impact on households ’ real income and 
hence on private consumption. 
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Table 6.5a: Macroeconomic Results (using the TD-BU model) 
Variable % changes from base year 
 Option 1 Option 2 
 
Private Consumption 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
0.255 
0.002 
 
-0.540 
1.335 
 
 
Table 6.5b: Changes in marginal propensity to save 
Variable Base Option 1 Option 2 
Marginal propensity to save: 
Low income 
High income 
 
0.04 
0.600 
 
0.004 
0.372 
 
0.002 
0.252 
Note: Figures in column 3 and 4 are given as % changes from base year. 
 
In addition there were also minor reductions in labor supply as presented in Table 
6.6.   
 
Table 6.6:  Labor supply changes 
Variable Option 1 (%) Option 2 (%) 
Labor supply -0.240 -0.210 
Note: Results are taken from the discrete labor supply module. 
 
From Table 6.6, we find minor reductions in labor supply for both the two options. 
We want to check what exactly happens to labor supply as social assistance transfers are 
increased in the discrete labor supply model. Theoretically there are two different issues 
to consider following an increase in social assistance transfers which are financed by 
increases in direct taxes, as was explained in the general equilibrium setting in Section 
6.1. Firstly, a lower after-tax wage rate generates two conflicting results on labor supply 
decisions. On one hand, a decrease in after-tax wage rate decreases the opportunity cost 
of leisure, inducing a worker to substitute work for leisure, thereby resulting in a decrease 
in the labor supply (substitution effect). On the other hand, a decrease in after-tax wage 
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also decreases the worker’s real income, hence he or she will also decrease consumption 
of normal goods including leisure (income effect), leading to an increase in the labor 
supply. Further, there is a pure income effect, stemming from the fact that an increase in 
social assistance transfers (non-labor income) leads to an increase in real income, which 
will induce individuals to consume more leisure and less work (decrease in labor supply). 
We have a corner solution scenario, where an individual only decides to work or not to 
work.    
For those who are working already, a decrease in disposable wage will 
unlikely decrease labor supply, since we have set the utility of not working equal 
to zero or negative. For those not working there will be no decrease in labor 
supply since the utility is already zero. Hence in this setting there will be minimal 
substitution effect.  Overall it depends on which income effect outweighs the 
other. If income effect from increase in non-labor income is greater than income 
effect from reduction in disposable wage rate, then labor supply will decrease and 
vice versa. Some authors argue that the two income effects should actually almost 
cancel out each other, since increases in income tax exactly match the increase in 
social assistance transfers (Gwartney et al., 1983); hence one of the possible 
explanations why changes in labor supply are minor in this case.  
6.2.3 Poverty and inequality analysis  
 
In the top-down bottom-up model, we adjusted household income by a household 
specific price index based on their consumption whilst maintaining the poverty 
line fixed in real terms. We created a fictitious household with equivalized total 
expenditures exactly equal to equivalized poverty lines. Then we used their new 
consumer price index after simulation to adjust the poverty lines.  We used both 
relative and absolute poverty measures.  
Table 6.7 presents relative and absolute poverty measures for the linked 
top-down, bottom-up model. The first column gives results for option 1 and the 
next column gives results for option 2. Doubling social assistance transfers leads 
to a 5.5 percentage point reduction in poverty if we use a relative poverty measure 
and 7 percentage point reduction if we use an absolute poverty line of R322 per 
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month for option 1. Social assistance was effective in pushing poor people closer 
to or over the poverty line. Still, even after using the TD-BU model, option 2 gives 
the smallest reduction in poverty. 
 
Table 6.7: Poverty measures 
Variable                Estimate (%)    
            Option 1      Option 2  
Relative poverty (1/2 of median income)  
Base income      27.287   27.287 
Simulation income     21.770   21.977 
Absolute poverty (R322 per month poverty line) 
Base income      29.753   29.753 
       Simulation income           22.614         25.111 
Note: Own calculations, using the poverty headcount for the analysis. 
 
From Table 6.7, the overall percentage changes in poverty measures seem 
to be relatively small in magnitude. This could be partly explained by the 
following reasons: firstly, it could be due to the fact that we are using the poverty 
headcount measure and not the poverty gap. Using the poverty gap will yield 
slightly higher percentage changes. Secondly, the magnitude of these changes also 
depends on whether or not the scope of the study covered only programme 
participants or measured the impact on poverty nationally. For example, South 
Africa’s social pension reduces the poverty gap for households  with only older 
people by 96%, but this translates to a national poverty gap reduction of only 21% 
(Samson et al., 2004). In this study we used a national poverty measure, hence the 
reason why poverty reductions are smaller in magnitude. Nevertheless a 5.5 
percentage point reduction shows a significant change in national poverty 
measure. Lastly, since we are taking into account general equilibrium effects, the 
prices of products bought by the poor rise, and they also bear some of the 
financing burden through either direct or indirect taxes, given that we are having a 
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budget neutral financing program, hence their real disposable incomes do not 
increase much.  
Table 6.8 presents inequality measures for the linked top-down, bottom-up model. 
The first column relates to the benchmark scenario. The second column gives results for 
option 1 while the third column gives results for option 2. Different inequality measures 
have been used since there is no consensus on which measure is the best. Detailed 
explanations of these inequality indices are given in Appendix D. There were reductions 
in most inequality measures following an increase in social assistance; for example, the 
Gini coefficient decreased by about 3 percentage points. Comparing results for the two 
options, option 1 is still preferred to option 2. 
Table 6.8: Inequality measures (TD-BU model) 
Inequality measure    Before simulation  After simulation income (%)  
                                   Income (%)              Option 1                 Option 2 
Relative mean deviation  47.714      44.980  46.206 
Coefficient of variation  200.807     183.905            195.676 
Gini coefficient   62.550       59.165  60.546 
Theil index (GE (a), a = 1)  78.393        69.573  74.026 
Mean Log Deviation (GE (a), a = 0) 77.000        66.153  69.853 
Atkinson measures (eps = 1) 53.699        48.394  50.268 
       Sen‘s welfare index       6337.190             6697.557       6438.268 
Note: Own calculations. 
Option 1 is preferred to option 2 on welfare grounds if we use Sen’s welfare 
measure and Atkinson’s welfare index (See Table 6.8 before).  
6.3 Comparison of different Models 
 
We now want to assess the benefits of linking the two models, the CGE model and               
the MS model. In the first part of this section we compare different poverty, 
inequality and welfare measures of the results obtained from the top-down, 
bottom-up model with those of the MS-only model. While in the second part of 
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this section we assessed the importance of taking back feedback effects from the 
MS model to the CGE model, by closely analyzing aggregate behaviors of 
representative households and that of individual households in the MS model. 
 
6.3.1 Comparison of poverty, inequality and welfare measures for 
different approaches 
 
According to Bourguignon and Savard (2008), there are two forces leading to 
changes in poverty measures after simulations. Firstly, it is a pure distributional 
effect arising from changes in household incomes following changes in social 
assistance transfers which affects both TD-BU and MS models. Secondly, it is a 
change that arises from an adjustment in the structure of prices that changes 
relative income of households. The second effect only affects the TD-BU model, 
since prices are fixed in the MS model.   
Table 6.9 presents a comparison of various poverty measures for different 
approaches. Results for the two models, MS and TD-BU models move in the same 
direction after simulation. All in all, the MS-only model seems to give slightly 
higher poverty measures for option 1 and vice versa for option 2; this result was 
observed regardless of which poverty measure was used (both relative and 
absolute poverty measures). This is mainly because the TD-BU models include 
price changes and under option 2 prices increase by a higher proportion making 
real disposable income lower and hence leading to lower poverty reduction than 
for the MS-only model (where prices are fixed).  
In addition, the difference in poverty measures between the MS-only and TD-BU 
models matters most when we use an absolute poverty measure rather than a relative 
measure of poverty. Absolute poverty measures the absence of enough resources to 
secure basic commodities, while relative poverty refers to poverty as being socially 
defined; comparing one group of people to others. Relative poverty is closely linked to 
income inequality; it is defined in terms of overall distribution of income. Changes in 
prices are too small to generate big changes in overall distribution of income. That is why 
there are no big differences between the MS-only model and the TD-BU model when a 
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relative poverty measure is used. The fact that the difference in poverty measures 
between the MS-only model and the TD-BU model is most important when we use an 
absolute poverty measure rather than a relative measure of poverty, serves to justify the 
use of a linked TD-BU model especially in developing countries, given the fact that 
absolute poverty measures are commonly used there. Fulfillment of basic needs (absolute 
poverty) matters more in developing economies, than a relative poverty measure 
(Ravallion, 2010 and Oosthuizen, 2008).  
Table 6.9: Poverty measures (comparison of different approaches) 
Variable        Estimate (%)   Estimate (%) 
          Option 1    Option 2 
Absolute poverty (R322 per month poverty line)
34
 
Base income      29.753   29.753 
TD-BU model      22.614   25.111 
MS-only model     22.680   23.950 
Relative poverty (1/2 of median income) 
Base income      27.287   27.287 
TD-BU model       21.770   21.977 
      MS-only model            21.780        21.904 
Note: R322 was a lower threshold poverty line for that year as given by Statistics South Africa. 
 
Table 6.10 presents a comparison of inequality measures for both TD-BU 
model and MS-only model. The first column gives results for option 1 while the 
second column gives results for option 2. It can be seen that across all inequality 
measures the MS-only model gives the smallest reduction in inequality for option 
1 and the reverse holds true for option 2. This shows the importance of taking 
price changes from the CGE model. Even though the magnitude of the differences 
is small, there is no doubt that it is important to take into consideration price 
changes from the CGE model, since it has resulted in further reduction or increase 
in all income inequality measures, depending on which financing option is used. In 
                                                 
34
 This was a lower threshold poverty line for that year as given by Statistics South Africa. 
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considering the magnitude of these differences we should consider the fact that the 
study did not only cover program participants (only those receiving the 
government transfers) but measured the impact of poverty and inequality for the 
whole nation
35
.  
 
Table 6.10: Inequality measures (comparison of different approaches)  
Inequality measure                Option 1 (%)   Option 2 (%) 
Gini coefficient:    
Before simulation   62.550    62.550 
TD-BU model    59.165    60.546 
MS-only model   59.173    60.500 
Mean log deviation (GE (a), a = 0):     
Before simulation   77.000    77.000 
TD-BU model    66.153    69.853 
       MS-only model          66.177          69.576 
Source: Own table. 
For welfare comparison we used Atkinson index and Sen’s welfare measures. An 
explanation of these two welfare measures is given in Appendix D. Welfare results are 
presented in Table 6.11. The table gives Sen’s welfare index and Atkinson welfare index 
for the TD-BU and the MS-only models.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 This partly helps to explain why the differences are smaller in magnitude.   
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Table 6.11: Welfare measures for the two models 
Type of 
welfare 
index 
Base year Option 1 
TD-BU                 MS-only  
model               Model 
            Option 2 
 TD-BU                      MS-only     
model                         Model 
Sen’s welfare 
Index 
Atkinson 
Index 
  6337.190 
 
    53.699 
6697.557          6693.232 
 
      48.394              48.406 
  6438.268               6533.831 
 
   50.268                       50.130 
Source: Own table. 
From Table 6.11, the TD-BU method dominates the MS-only model on 
welfare grounds for option 1 and the reverse holds true for option 2, if we use 
Sen’s welfare index and Atkinson index. Now the difference between the MS 
model and the TD-BU model is clear and higher when using welfare indices, 
unlike what was the case with inequality and poverty indices.  
6.3.2 Assessing the importance of feedback effect in TD-BU Model 
According to Savard (2003), the main contribution of the TD-BU approach stems 
from the fact that behavior of the representative households in the CGE model is 
not a perfect aggregation of behavior of individual households in the MS model, 
which justifies taking back these feedback effects to the CGE model. From Table 
6.5b, we observed that there were major changes in marginal propensity to save
36
  
in the TD-BU model, which can highlight the existence of feedback effects. 
Colombo (2010) pointed out that these changes in mps could be due to two 
reasons; firstly it could arise from data inconsistency between the two datasets, 
social accounting matrix (which is used as the main database for the CGE model) 
and the household survey data. Secondly it could be due to feedback effects from 
the MS model
37
. In this study the first reason of data inconsistency is very 
minimal, since the social accounting matrix was constructed in such a way that it 
is fully consistent with the data observed in the survey. We weighted and 
aggregated all household income and expenditure items from the survey and then 
                                                 
36
 A variable which was flexed after linking the two models 
37
 Arising, mainly from the fact that, in MS model we consider single households in CGE model we have 
representative households.   
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used these shares to build the household income and expenditure items in the 
SAM. Hence changes in marginal propensity to save can be attributed mainly to 
feedback effects.  
We now consider individual components of household income and 
expenditure behavior to find the main cause of feedback effects. Variation in these 
variables will determine the magnitude of the differences between the MS model 
and the CGE model results. Savard (2003) pointed out that there is perfect 
aggregation from the income side (capital income, government income and foreign 
income), apart from labor supply. For example, for capital income, which 
aggregate perfectly we have: 
 



Hh
hH KSPKKSPK ** ,         (6.3) 
 
where PK  is a price of capital, KS  is an initial value of capital stock and small 
letter subscripts denote items at individual level while capital letter subscripts 
denote items at aggregated representative household level.  
Table 6.12 gives a comparison of labor supply figures from the two models.  
The first column gives labor supply changes from the MS model and second 
column gives labor supply changes from the CGE model.  
Table 6.12: Comparison of labor supply changes for option 1 
Variable MS model (%) CGE model (%) 
Labor supply changes: -0.240 -0.030 
Source: Own table 
 
In general we have minor changes in labor supply, but there are differences in 
labor supply changes from different models. Labor supply responses are smaller in 
the CGE model than in the MS model. The difference could be attributed to both 
different ways of modeling labor supply in the two models and also to feedback 
effects.   
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From the expenditure side, Section 5.4.2 gave a detailed explanation of why 
linear expenditure demand curves do not aggregate perfectly. Table 6.13 gives 
consumption expenditure changes from the two models.  
 
Table 6.13: Comparison of total consumption expenditure changes for option1 
Variable MS model CGE Model 
Total consumption 
expenditure: 
Low income household 
High income household 
 
 
31.865 
-5.329 
 
 
 
27.225 
-2.357 
Source: Own table 
 
From Table 6.13, we have significant differences in total consumption 
expenditure changes for the two models, even though the changes move in the 
same direction. This highlights the fact that consumption expenditure changes are 
the main source of feedback effects. The MS model gives higher increases for low 
income households and higher decreases for those in high income households  than 
the CGE model. The differences mainly come from two items; firstly it stems from 
differences in income tax calculations for the two models and secondly from the 
fact that individual household behavior in the MS model is different from 
‘average’ representative household behavior in the CGE model. 
Income tax changes differ in the two models because, in the MS model 
income tax calculations depend on the income tax bracket to which an individual 
household belongs, while in the CGE model income tax is calculated as a 
proportion of the representative household’s income. In the MS model we use 
differentiated tax rates while in the CGE model we use same or ‘average’ shares. 
So we have the following: 
h
N
Hh
yhHHy YtYT 

 ,                                                                                              (6.4) 
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where yht is income tax rate calculated on specific individual household income, 
HyT  is income tax rate for the aggregated representative household, hY  is individual 
household income and YH is aggregated representative household income.  
 
The effect of changes in income taxes in the model is captured via the labor 
market, by altering disposable wages and also via consumption changes, by 
altering disposable income. Since we are using both changes in consumption levels 
and labor supply as linking variables from the MS model back to the CGE model 
we indirectly transfer the level of disposable income which is not compatible with 
what was used in the CGE model. Hence it is important to take back feedback 
effects from the MS model to the CGE model since individual behavior in the MS 
model does not always correspond to the aggregate behavior used in the CGE 
model.  
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CHAPTER 7  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Although social assistance transfers have grown at a faster pace in years following 
closely after independence in South Africa, its income inequality still remains one of the 
highest in the world. This thesis used a top-down, bottom-up model which combines an 
econometrically-estimated MS model of labor supply, a detailed tax-benefit module, and 
a computable general equilibrium model, in order to analyze the impact of social 
assistance transfers on reducing income inequality in South Africa.   
The CGE model allowed us to take into account general equilibrium effects 
of increasing social assistance transfers to low income households, such as relative 
price effects, and it also let us consider implications of different financing options. 
Financing social assistance transfers by an increase in income tax (option 1) gives 
a higher increase in absorption. This increase mainly comes from a higher increase 
in private consumption. Option 1 also gives a higher reduction in poverty head 
count (of about 4%) than option 2 (where transfers are financed through an 
increase in commodity taxes). Option 1 offers a higher reduction in poverty and 
inequality measures, mainly because under this option low income households are 
taxed less than those in the high income group, so the income of low income 
households is not reduced much due to taxation like what is the case with option 2. 
This helps to push them (low income households) above the poverty line, 
following an increase in government transfers. On the other hand, option 2 offers a 
lower poverty reduction mainly because commodity taxes are levied on all 
products, which affect all household groups. It is not only those in the high income 
group who bear most of the cost of financing the government transfers. In addition 
option 2 cannot be regarded as a better option since there is a conflict of interests, 
decrease in absorption and inequality when transfers are financed by commodity 
tax. We also have minor reductions in labor supply for option 1, highlighting the 
fact social assistance does not provide major disincentives to work.  
The TD-BU model allowed us to take into account both heterogeneity of 
economic agents (since it uses micro data sets) and general equilibrium effects of 
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increasing social assistance transfers to low income households. Overall results 
show that even though the doubling of social assistance transfers did not generate 
dramatic changes in macroeconomic variables, it caused significant reductions in 
both inequality and poverty measures. Doubling social assistance leads to a 5.5% 
reduction in poverty if we use a relative poverty measure and 7% if we use an 
absolute poverty line of R322 per month. The overall percentage changes in 
poverty measures seem to be relatively small (5.5%) in magnitude, after doubling 
social assistance transfers to poor households. This mainly stems from the fact that 
we are using the poverty headcount measure and not the poverty gap. Using the 
poverty gap will yield slightly higher percentage changes. In addition, the 
magnitude of these changes also depends on whether or not the scope of the study 
covered only program participants or measured the impact on poverty nationally.  
In this study we used a national poverty measure, hence one of the reason why 
poverty reductions are small in magnitude.  
Despite an increase in social assistance transfers to low income households, 
actual distribution of income seems to only have changed slightly (3%), even 
though the number of poor people has decreased. This is also confirmed by earlier 
results by other researchers; Lehman (2010) and Armstrong (2008) also found a 
marginal impact of social assistance transfers on income inequality. The most 
probable explanation could be due to the fact that social assistance transfers are 
too tiny to make a big impact on inequality, despite good targeting. Social 
assistance transfers are too tiny relative to the income of the population’s top 
earners. Inequality is broader than poverty, since it focuses on the entire 
population and not only those below the poverty line, as poverty does. Hence 
reductions in inequality will be much lower than reductions in poverty measures.   
Secondly, this lower reduction in inequality measures could be explained 
by the fact that, since we are taking into account general equilibrium effects, 
prices of products bought by those in the low income group rise, following an 
increase in government transfers. In addition, they also bear some of the financing 
burden through either indirect taxes or commodity taxes, given that we are having 
a budget neutral financing program. As a result, their real disposable income does 
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not increase much in comparison to that of high income households. Chia et al. 
(1994) support the same idea by concluding that  when general equilibrium effects 
are taken into account, given a budget neutral targeting program; it is more 
difficult to eliminate poverty than is suggested by traditional analysis. Option 1 is 
preferred to option 2 on welfare grounds using both Sen’s welfare index and 
Atkinson index.  
To assess the benefits of taking price changes from the CGE model to the 
MS model, we compared the results from the top-down, bottom-up model with 
those of the MS-only model. We found out that result for the two models move in 
the same direction. All in all we discovered that using MS-only model, in 
comparison to TD-BU model, gave a slightly less reduction in poverty measures 
for option 1 and vice versa for option 2. This result was observed regardless of 
which poverty measure was used (both relative and absolute poverty measures). 
This is mainly because the TD-BU models include price changes. Under option 2 
prices increase by a higher proportion, making real disposable income lower and 
hence leading to lower poverty reduction than for the MS-only model (where 
prices are fixed). We can conclude that when price changes are bigger, then the 
difference between the MS-only model and the linked TD-BU model matters most.  
Furthermore, the differences in poverty measures between the MS-only and 
the TD-BU models are most important when we use an absolute poverty measure 
rather than a relative measure of poverty. Relative poverty is closely linked to 
income inequality; it is defined in terms of overall distribution of income. Changes 
in prices are too tiny to generate big changes in overall distribution of income. 
That is why there are no large differences between the MS-only model and the TD-
BU model when a relative poverty measure is used. The fact that the difference in 
poverty measures between the MS-only and the TD-BU model matters most when 
we use an absolute poverty measure rather than a relative measure of poverty, also 
justifies the use of a linked TD-BU model in developing countries, where it is 
argued that absolute poverty is of paramount importance.   
We also found out that the MS-only model gave the smallest reduction in 
inequality for option 1 in comparison to the TD-BU model and the reverse holds 
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true for option 2 across all inequality measures. This again confirms the 
importance of taking price changes from the CGE model. Even though the 
magnitude of the differences is small, there is no doubt that it is important to take 
into consideration price changes from the CGE model, since it has resulted in 
further reduction or increase in all income inequality measures, depending on 
which financing option is used. Neglecting these price changes may slightly 
overestimate or underestimate inequality and poverty measures, depending on 
which financing option is used. In considering the magnitude of these differences, 
we should consider the fact that the study did not only cover program participants 
only (only those receiving social assistance transfers) but measured the impact of 
poverty and inequality on the whole nation.  
We also found out that the TD-BU method dominates the MS-only model 
based on welfare grounds for option 1 and the reverse holds true for option 2. This 
result was found to be most important when price changes are higher.  
Lastly, feedback effects from the MS model to the CGE model play a 
crucial role in a linked model, not only for poverty, inequality and welfare 
analysis but also to capture the differences between individual behavior and the 
behavior of aggregated representative households as reflected by differences in 
income tax changes and consumption expenditure changes between the two models 
after policy simulation. 
The TD-BU model developed in this thesis produces results that could be 
helpful to shed light on the current debate about the impact of social assistance 
transfers on reducing income inequality and poverty. However, in order to achieve 
long term solutions to the situation of perpetual poverty and inequality, a 
sustainable solution for alleviating poverty should be found, like human capital 
development.  
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Appendix A: Tax and benefit Imputation  
This appendix gives a detailed description of how taxes and social assistance were 
calculated or imputed in our model. In particular it discusses steps followed to calculate 
tax paid and social assistance.  
Tax Calculation 
Taxes in South Africa are calculated on an individual basis irrespective of number of 
children or marital status. In our database, apart from income from labor, all incomes 
are given at household level. Hence, it was assumed that the household head will 
declare and pay taxes for all income given at household level
38
. Figure A.1 
summarizes how tax paid was actually calculated.  
Figure A.1: Tax calculations 
 
Source: own diagram. 
                                                 
38
 This introduced some bias in terms of tax liability calculations.  
Sum of all individual labor income  
Deduct all applicable deductions (medical 
aid and pension contributions)  
  
Add all other household income 
(allocated to the household head) 
     
Less lump sum payments on retirement 
Less all other deductions (e.g. medical aid- for those not 
working, donations 
 loss incurred, dividends)     
   
)  
Deduct all applicable deductions (medical aid, pension 
contributions)  
  
 working, donations 
 loss incurred, dividends )     
=Taxable income (apply tax 
rules to get payable tax) 
Less Rebates 
=Net tax (and sum taxes 
for all members of one 
household)  
Add Lump sum taxes 
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Deductions
39
 include among others: 
 Pension contributions, which are also given at household level, but the 
value in the data appears to be underestimated (see Wilkinson, 2009).  In 
South Africa, pension contributions vary according to different pension 
schemes. Since it is not known which particular scheme an individual 
belongs to, an average rate is used. Following Wilkinson (2009) we use a 
contribution of 5.5% of gross salary to pension’s schemes .   
 Deductions for medical aid contributions differ according to age. All those 
over 65 years could claim all their medical expenses, and for those below 
65 years, the maximum amount they could claim was limited to the amount 
they paid in excess of R1 000 or 5% of taxable income (whichever is 
greater). That is, the first R1 000 or first 5% of taxable income would not 
qualify as a deduction. In our data set medical aid is only reported at 
household level, hence, following Wilkinson (2009), the amount recorded 
at the household level is allocated to different household members 
according to their labor income or just to the household head if others are 
not working. 
 Lump sum payments on retirement: Part of Lump sum benefits are tax 
deductible. The maximum amount deductible for tax purposes was the 
greater of R120 000 or R4 500 multiplied by number of years of 
membership, but since we do not have information regarding number of 
years of membership, the first criterion is used.  The excess after deducting 
the tax free rate of R120 000 is taxed using the average rate of tax and not 
the marginal tax rate in order to get lump sum taxes.  
 Local dividends from all South African companies are exempt from tax at 
the household level, in order to avoid double taxation.   
 Donations made to certain organizations, for example universities, 
education and churches are also tax deductible, only up to a maximum of 
either R500 or 2% of taxable income. 
                                                 
39
 All these deductions apply to the year 2000, which is the year the survey was conducted as explained 
earlier.   
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 Losses incurred in making a profit are also tax deductible.  
The following problem was encountered when calculating taxes: The tax 
schedule applies to cumulated income per annum, but the database does not 
provide information on whether an individual worked the whole year or not, or 
whether gross earnings were constant throughout the year. In our calculations we 
assumed that the given gross earnings were constant throughout the year.  
The tax is imposed at a progressive block rate with low taxable income being 
taxed at a lower tax rate than higher taxable income. The table below gives the 
detailed tax schedule for South Africa.  
Table A.1: Income Tax schedule rules 
Taxable income (Y)      Rate 
 (Rand)         
1 – 35 000         0.18 [Y] 
35 001 – 45 000      R6 300 + 0.26 [Y-35 000] 
45 001 – 60 000      R8 900 + 0.32 [Y-45 000] 
60 001 – 70 000      R13 700 + 0.37 [Y-60 000] 
70 001 – 200 000      R17 400 + 0.40 [Y-70 000]  
200 001 and above      R69 400 + 0.42 [Y-200 000] 
Rebates 
Primary   rebate R3 800 
Age 65 and over in addition to primary rebate R2 900 
Tax thresholds: 
Below 65        R21 111 
Age 65 and above       R37 222 
Source: South African Revenue Services. 
 
Table A.2 gives a comparison of imputed figures and actual figures as 
reported in official statistics for that particular year. The first column gives actual 
figures that are reported by the South African Revenue Services, the next column 
gives figures reported in survey data and the last column gives imputed figures.  
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Table A.2: Personal income tax data: In comparison with actual tax paid reported in official 
data 
R million Actual figures 
reported by SARS 
Survey data Imputed data 
Average tax paid 
(mean) 
--- 3 227 8 013 
Tax revenue 86 476 36 400 89 300 
Source: National Treasury, South Africa (August 2004) and own calculation. 
 
After applying the tax rules the average income tax burden (mean) increased 
from R3 227 before any adjustment to R8 013 after adjustment. Total tax revenue 
also increased significantly from R36 400 million to R89 300 million, which is 
slightly higher than the reported figure of R86 476 million. This is mainly due to 
the fact that the reported figure from the South African Revenue Services of R86 
476 million excludes tax from lump sum benefits, which was around R5 219 
million for this year.  
Social assistance module  
This section describes the imputation of social assistance transfers using our 
database. The following social assistance transfers were  imputed; Child Support 
Grant, Foster Grant, Care dependence Grant, Disability Grant and Social Old Age 
Grant. Firstly, the definition of “household” in our survey (and in an African 
context at large) includes all people living under the same roof and sharing 
expenses (extended family). The household consists of large numbers of extended 
family members who are often supported by one, two or more older members. This 
was taken into consideration in our social assistance imputation. 
Secondly, the Child Support Grant is given to caregivers of children, but the 
South African Income and Expenditure Survey does not contain information on 
biological parents or primary caregivers. We used a technique which closely 
follows that of Woorlard (2003) in order to identify primary caregivers as follows: 
i. The oldest woman in the household aged 13 – 40 years at the time of 
birth of the child.  
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ii. If none, then the youngest woman in the household aged 41 or over at 
the time of birth of the child. 
iii. If none, the oldest male in the household aged 13-40 at the time of birth 
of the child was used. 
iv. If none, the youngest male in household aged 41 or over at the time of 
birth of the child. 
v. If none, any person older than 18 in the household.  
 
Thirdly, there is no information given in the survey in order to identify 
disabled children, in order to determine eligibility for the Care Dependency Grant. 
Instead we made use of the information given in the Labor Force Survey showing 
whether someone receives a Care Dependency Grant or not. In addition, no 
information is available in the survey to identify foster children, since the survey 
does not include information on biological parents of children. We made use of the 
information given in the Labor Force Survey showing whether someone receives a 
Foster Care Grant or not.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine eligibility for Disability Assistance 
since there is no direct information in the survey on whether one is disabled or not. 
Instead, we used one of the questions in the Labor Force Survey where 
respondents were asked to give reasons for not working, and disability was given 
as a response. This was used together with what was already given in the Income 
and Household Survey.  
Finally, for Social Old Age Pensions calculations we used a formula given in 
Woorlard (2003)
40
 as follows: 
Single people: BAD 5.015.1        (A.1) 
Married people: BAD 5.0075.1                  (A.2) 
Where: 
A  is the maximum grant payable per annum (According to rules).  
B is the annual income of the applicant (single people), or half of the 
applicant and his or her spouse’s combined annual income.  
                                                 
40
 The formula corresponds to how SOAP law were applied for this particular year.  
 95 
D is the annual grant amount payable. 
 
Table A.3 summarizes how the imputed figures relate to official statistics. The 
first column gives figures reported in survey, while column two gives actual figures that 
are reported by National Treasury South Africa and the last column gives imputed 
figures. 
Table A.3: Social assistance data: In comparison with actual social assistance expenditure 
reported in official data 
Type of grant Survey data 
(before imputation) 
(In million rand) 
Official figures 
(In million rand) 
Imputed figures 
(In million rand) 
Child Support Grant 862 1 411 4 563 
Care Dependency 
Grant 
 
--- 
 
249 
 
188 
Foster Care Grant --- 276 151 
Disability Grant 1 592 3 973 3 890 
Social Old Age 
Pensions 
 
12 472 
 
12 954 
 
13 592 
Source: National Treasury, South Africa (August 2004) and own calculation . 
Note: Figure for Child Support Grant (survey data) reflects the total for all three types of children 
assistance. 
 
In general the imputed figures are in line with the reported official figures for that 
year, apart from Child Support Assistance. This is mainly due to the fact that for this 
particular year (2000) the take-up rate for child assistance was very low. Some eligible 
children and households do not apply or receive assistance, either because they are 
unaware of their entitlement or lack the documentation, time and resources necessary to 
access the social support system, or due to social and psychological factors for example 
stigma. According to Samson et al. (2004) the take-up rate was very low for this 
particular year.  
In order to rectify this problem and ensure that the imputed take-up rate is closer 
to official statistics we modeled the take-up rate for this grant. The model view take-up as 
fully determined by decisions of eligible applicants, given that all eligible applicants are 
guaranteed social assistance.  A stepwise logistic regression was run to examine the 
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probability of taking up the benefit which one is entitled to. A variable was only retained 
if it improves the fit of the model. A binary logistic choice model was used. 
uxy ii  
*
,          (A.3) 
where  is a set of coefficients and u is a random disturbance term. Whether an individual 
takes up or not his benefit is indicated by the observable variable iy , where 
 
   0    if yi* <0 
yi=     1   if yi* >0        (A.4) 
       
The probability that an individual takes up his or her benefit conditional on 
the values of ix is given by, 
Pr (yi =1 |xi)  = Pr (yi*>0 | xi) 
   =
)exp(1
)exp(
i
i
x
x



 .      (A.5) 
 
Selection of possible explanatory variables was guided by the fact that 
caregivers will only claim the social assistance if the benefits of claiming surpass 
the monetary, time and psychological costs of claiming the benefit. Following 
other previous studies
41
, the following explanatory variables were included: race 
dummy (Dumrace), Education dummy (Education dummy), gender dummy (Gender), 
age and age squared of caregiver, location dummy (Location dummy), employment 
status of caregiver (Working status), a dummy variable showing presence or not of 
dependent children in the household (Children dummy), another dummy variable 
showing presence or not of transport within 15 minutes walking distance 
(Transport),  marital status of caregiver (Marital status), a dummy variable showing 
whether or not the household receives other social assistance (other assistance), 
(household income minus social assistance) divided by 1000 (Income), a dummy 
variable showing whether or not the household own their main source of dwelling 
(Type of dwelling)  and province dummy variable (Dumprov). 
                                                 
41
 See Hernanz et al. (2004), Blundel et al.(1988), Bruckmeier et al. (2011), Duclos (1995) and Barnes and 
Noble(2006) 
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Table A.4: Description of variables used in benefit take-up equation 
Variable    Description 
Dumrace  dummy variable for different races: Black=1 (reference), 
Colored=2, Asian=3, White=4. 
Education  dummy variable for education: primary and lower secondary 
school=0, upper secondary and tertiary =1.  
Gender dummy  dummy variable for gender: male= 0, female=1 
Location dummy         location dummy variable: urban=0, rural=1 
Working status variable showing employment status of caregiver: working=1, 
unemployed=0 
Children dummy  variable highlighting the presence or not of dependent children in 
the Household (children below 10 years) : No=0, Yes=1 
Marital status  a dummy variable showing marital status of caregiver: married= 0, 
single=1 
Transport a dummy variable showing presence or not of transport within 15 
minutes walking distance: Yes=1, No=0 
Other assistance a dummy variable showing whether or not the household receives 
other social assistance: Yes= 1, No =0 
Type of dwelling a dummy variable showing whether or not the household own their 
main source of dwelling: Yes= 1, No =0 
Dumprov province dummy variable: 
 
Education dummy variable can have both positive and negative impact on 
take-up rate. On one hand ignorance of the system or complex claim procedures 
can present a barrier to claiming the social assistance. On the other hand more 
educated people may feel more stigmatized thereby reducing their probability to 
take-up. Children dummy was included since presence of more dependent children 
adds to the needs of household and likely to increase the probability of take-up. 
Marital status variable was included, because the presence of another  adult in the 
household may result in the household being able to cope without claiming social 
assistance. Single caregivers are likely to claim than married couples.  Age is 
associated with attitudes of greater independence and reluctance to accept 
‘charity’ and might be expected to have a negative relation on take-up. 
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Unemployed caregivers may anticipate getting a job shortly hence they don’t 
claim, whereas income of those employed is stable and predictable, so they claim. 
Accessibility to good transport system makes it easy for caregivers to go and claim 
social assistance. Home ownership may indicate financial independence and signal 
high psychological costs associated with taking up the social assistance. 
Estimation was done at caregiver or adult level, since it is the adult in a family 
who decide to take-up or not the benefit. Table A.5 gives estimation results from the 
logit model.  
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Table A.5: Estimates for Child Support grant take-up model 
Wald chi2 (25)                                                918.38,            Prob> chi2   0 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R
2
                                   0.160 
Variable Coefficient (Standard errors) 
Dumrace2 
 
Dumrace3 
 
Dumrace4 
 
Education dummy 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Age squared 
 
Location dummy 
 
Working status 
 
Marital status 
 
Transport 
 
Source of light 
 
Other assistance 
 
Income 
 
Type of dwelling 
 
Children dummy 
 
Entitlement value 
 
Dumprov2 
 
Dumprov3 
 
Dumprov4 
 
Dumprov5 
 
Dumprov6 
 
Dumprov7 
 
Dumprov8 
 
Dumprov9 
 
Constant 
0.704*** 
(0.120) 
0.835*** 
(0.287) 
0.153 
(0.262) 
-0.077 
(0.087) 
1.122*** 
(0.218) 
0.073* 
(0.017) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.305*** 
(0.083) 
-0.299** 
(0.089) 
0.926*** 
(0.083) 
0.194 
(0.143) 
0.210** 
(0.082) 
0.028 
(0.212) 
-0.071** 
(0.282) 
0.119 
(0.086) 
1.004*** 
(0.105) 
0.117*** 
(0.014) 
-0.538** 
(0.156) 
0.279* 
(0.150) 
-0.844*** 
0.193 
-0.656*** 
(0.162) 
-0.148 
(0.163) 
-0.206 
(0.150) 
0.174 
(0.161) 
-0.361* 
(0.168) 
-7.490 
Note: *** Significant at 1%,    ** significant at 5%,   * significant at 10%. 
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Being White, Asian and Colored relative to being Black, being female, age, being 
single, availability of transport within 15 minutes walking distance, presence of other 
dependent children in the household and the value of entitlement all increase the 
probability of taking up the benefit which one is entitled to. While higher education, 
being employed and other household income all decrease the probability of taking up the 
benefit. 
Probabilities were proportionately adjusted until the required take-up rate was 
achieved. Table A.6 summarizes the adjusted Child Support Grant.  
 
 
Table A.6: Child Support Grant figures after adjustment 
 
Type of grant Survey data (before 
imputation) 
(In million rand) 
Official figures 
(In million rand) 
Imputed and adjusted  
figures (In million rand) 
Child Support 
Grant 
 
862 
 
1 411 
 
1440 
Source: Provincial Budgets and Expenditures Review: 2000/01 – 2007/08 and own calculation. 
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Appendix B: Discrete labor supply model 
The Appendix summarizes the procedure taken to estimate parameters for the wage 
earnings equation and selection model.  
Wage earnings equation 
The wage earnings equation (see Equation 4.14 before) was estimated using a 
Heckman two-step model. A reduced type of wage equation was used
42
, where the 
log of wage earnings ( LW ) of individual i  of household h  was assumed to 
depend on a vector of observable individual characteristics ( hiX ) and 
unobservable factors ( hiu ). The individual characteristics include the following 
variables: race (Dumrace), education (Education), age, age squared, gender (Gender 
dummy) and location (Location dummy).  
Table B.1: Description of wage earnings equation variables 
Variable    Description 
Dumrace  dummy variable for different races: Black=1 (reference), 
Colored=2, Asian=3, White=4. 
Education  dummy variable for education: Primary and lower secondary 
school=0, Upper Secondary and Tertiary =1. 
Gender dummy  dummy variable for gender: Male= 0, Female=1 
Location dummy         location dummy variable: Urban=0, Rural=1 
Chn6  variable highlighting the presence or not of children under 6 years 
in the Household: No=0, Yes=1 
 
Age and age squared were included in order to act as proxy for experience. 
Age squared captures potential non-linearity of age and wage earnings. The 
education dummy variable was included in order to control for human capital 
differences following the original Mincerian wage equation. The race dummy 
variable was included since characteristics that affect wage earnings could differ 
systematically across racial groups. The Heckman’s two step model was used in 
order to correct for sample selection bias. In estimating the wage earnings 
                                                 
42
 This was done due to lack of reliable data on actual number of working hours, which are needed to 
estimate a structural equation.  
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equation, there is a selection bias which stems from the fact that we only observe a 
positive wage for individuals who were working at the time of the survey.  This 
causes a concentration of observation at zero values, and ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimator will be biased since the Gauss-Markov assumption of zero 
correlation between independent variables and error terms will be violated. 
Heckman’s two step procedures consists of estimating two equations; the first step 
determines the decision of an individual whether to participate or not in the labor 
market following a probit model, where the inverse mills ratio is obtained and 
later used in the outcome equation.   
A dummy variable showing presence or not of children under six years 
(chn6) was included in the selection part of the Heckman model in order to act as 
an exclusion restriction variable.
43
 This is in line with what has been used in 
literature (see Kumor, 2010, Hausman, 1980 and Heim, 2007), where it is argued 
that this variable has a strong effect on labor force participation, but does not have 
direct impact on wage earnings. An exclusion restriction is included in order to 
facilitate model identification, since it makes the inverse mills ratio and vector of 
explanatory variables ( X ) in the outcome equation less correlated, thereby 
reducing multicollinearity among predictors and correlation between error terms. 
If no exclusion restriction is included, then identification will be based solely on 
the non-linearity of the inverse mills ratio (IMR). But identification based on 
nonlinearity of IMR can be very weak, since it has been shown that IMR can be 
linear for a good range of explanatory variables (Puhani, 2000).   
The estimation of wage equation was done on a subsample comprising only 
those at working age that is 16 to 64 years. Estimation was done separately for two 
demographic groups, single individuals and married couples, explicitly accounting 
for heterogeneity of behavioral responses across demographic groups. Table B.2 
presents estimation results from Heckman model.  
 
                                                 
43
 Exclusion restriction is a variable that affects selection model and not the outcome equation 
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Table B.2:  Wage earnings equation estimates 
Earnings equation 
Variable 
Single Individuals 
Coefficient ( Standard error) 
Married couples 
Coefficient (Standard error) 
Outcome equation- Log of wage: 
Dumrace2 
 
Dumrace3 
 
Dumrace4 
 
Education 
 
Age 
 
Gender dummy 
 
Age squared 
 
Location dummy 
 
Constant 
 
Selection equation- Work: 
Dumrace2 
 
Dumrace3 
 
Dumrace4 
 
Education 
 
Age 
 
Gender dummy 
 
Age squared 
 
Location dummy 
 
Chn6 
 
gender_chn6 
 
Constant 
 
Mills Lambda 
 
Rho 
Sigma 
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
Number of observation 
 
0.275*** 
(0.042) 
0.570*** 
(0.074) 
1.039** 
(0.056) 
0.775*** 
(0.021) 
0.080*** 
(0.017) 
-0.268** 
(0.021) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.391** 
(0.023) 
7.734*** 
(0.406) 
 
0.567*** 
(0.024) 
0.247*** 
(0.060) 
0.598** 
(0.040) 
0.170*** 
(0.017) 
0.243*** 
(0.004) 
-0.074** 
(0.016) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.131** 
(0.016) 
-0.306*** 
(0.016) 
-- 
 
-4.818*** 
(0.064) 
-0.222** 
(0.094) 
-0.220 
1.011 
2963.88 
0.000 
37340 
 
0.162*** 
(0.030) 
0.488*** 
(0.044) 
0.927** 
(0.032) 
0.847*** 
(0.025) 
-0.221*** 
(0.011) 
0.072** 
(0.059) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.413** 
(0.019) 
8.204*** 
(0.256) 
 
0.375** 
(0.026) 
0.006 
(0.050) 
0.271*** 
(0.033) 
0.311*** 
(0.022) 
-0.959** 
(0.024) 
0.153** 
(0.006) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.097** 
(0.019) 
-0.143 
(0.060) 
-0.038 
(0.036) 
-1.956*** 
(0.119) 
-0.648*** 
(0.113) 
-0.625 
1.037 
5750.00 
0.000 
24628 
*** Significant at 1%,    ** significant at 5%,   * significant at 10%. 
Note:
 
Results of the selection part of the Heckman model are not discussed in detail here, since 
the selection part was estimated separately using a probit model below. This was done in order to 
explicitly take into account the effect of disposable predicted wage (calculated from the Heckman 
model and subtracting respective taxes) and government income, which are our two main 
variables causing labor supply changes after each simulation.  
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Being Colored (Dumrace2), being Asian (Dumrace3) and being White 
(Dumrace4) have a positive effect on earnings, relative to being Black. Being 
female relative to male (Gender dummy) and being in the rural area relative to 
urban area (Location dummy) both have a negative effect on earnings. Age has a 
positive effect on earnings, while age squared has a negative effect, indicating the 
fact that wage earnings increase with age but at a decreasing rate.  The coefficient 
of the inverse mills ratio, lambda is negative and significant justifying the 
presence of sample selection. 
Selection model 
The selection model is a binomial probit model, consisting of both an observable 
part and an unobservable part (see Equation 4.15 before). Vector ( hiV ) which 
represents the observable part of the binomial probit model consists of the 
following variables; race, education, age, age squared, gender,  location dummy, 
government social transfer income, a dummy variable showing presence or not of 
children under six years (chn6) and disposable predicted earnings. A description of 
new variables is given in Table B.3. 
 
Table B.3: Description of selection model variables 
Variable     Description      
 
Disposable predict wage Real predicted disposable wages earnings which were  
    estimated using Heckman’s two step model, divided by  
    1000. It was calculated after subtracting taxes obtained  
    from tax module. 
Government income   Gives social assistance transfers to low income households  
    divided by 1000.  
 
Each individual at working age had to choose between two alternatives, 
being a wage worker or being inactive, hence, hiZ  is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if an individual is a wage worker and 0 otherwise.   
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The selection model was estimated separately using maximum likelihood. 
The estimation was done on a subsample comprising only those at working age 
that is 16 to 64 years. Estimation was done separately for two demographic 
groups, single individuals and married couples. Table B.4 presents estimation  
results for the selection model.    
Table B.4: Selection model Estimates 
Selection model 
 Single individuals 
Coefficient ( standard 
errors) 
Married couples 
Coefficient ( standard errors) 
Work 
dumrace2 
 
dumrace3 
 
dumrace4 
 
Education  
 
Gender dummy 
 
Age 
 
Age squared 
 
Location dummy 
 
Chn6 
 
Government income 
 
Gender * chn6 
 
Disposable predicted wage 
 
Constant 
 
 
Number of observation 
Wald chi2 
Prob> chi2 
 
 
0.523*** 
(0.028) 
0.121* 
(0.073) 
0.301** 
(0.094) 
0.036 
(0.042) 
-0.028 
(0.020) 
0.231*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.074** 
(0.023) 
-0.306*** 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
----- 
 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
-4.750*** 
(0.064) 
 
37340 
7658.95 
0.000 
 
0.367*** 
(0.027) 
-0.063 
(0.055) 
0.066 
(0.077) 
0.199*** 
(0.044) 
-0.963** 
(0.026) 
0.141*** 
(0.006) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.051** 
(0.024) 
-0.131** 
(0.060) 
-0.026*** 
(0.004) 
-0.042 
(0.036) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-1.809*** 
(0.120) 
 
24628 
4434.55 
0.000 
 
Note:*** Significant at 1%,    ** significant at 5%,   * significant at 10%. 
 
The effects of explanatory variables on the dependent variable are not 
linear; hence interpretation of coefficients is not as direct as in ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation, where coefficients give slope of change in dependent 
 106 
variable as explanatory variable changes. Now signs of coefficients tell us whether 
the probability of being employed increases or decreases as explanatory variables 
are changed. Gender dummy (being a female relative to male), location dummy 
(rural relative to urban), government income and the presence of children less than 
six years in the household (chn6), negatively influence the probability of being 
employed. While all race dummy variables, spouse’s education and disposable 
predicted wage have a positive effect on the probability of being employed. The 
probability of being employed increases with age but at a decreasing rate, that is 
probability of being employed increases with age initially and then decreases at a 
higher age, as indicated by a positive sign on age and a negative sign on age 
squared.  
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Appendix C: Linear expenditure system 
The Appendix summarizes the procedure taken to estimate parameters for the linear 
expenditure system given in section 4.3.1 (Equation 4.16). We used demographic 
translating in order to introduce demographic variables into the linear expenditure 
system. According to Pollak and Wales (1981), translating can be understood as 
allowing necessary or subsistence parameters of a demand system to depend on the 
demographic variables. We assumed that subsistence levels (λ’s) depend linearly 
on some set of demographic variables and that the remaining parameters are 
independent of demographic variables. Subsistence levels were made an explicit 
function of the socio-demographic characteristics as follows:  
edulocaKaAaa qqqqqhq ,4,3,2,1,0    ,     (C.1) 
where A  is the number of adults in the household minus 1, K is the number of 
children in the household (10 years and below), loc  is a location dummy variable 
(0= urban, 1= rural) and edu is education dummy for household head (0=low 
education, 1= high education).  
For estimation purposes, we used a stochastic form of the linear 
expenditure system obtained by adding a disturbance term, hq  to the share form of 
the demand equation. The share form was used in order to reduce 
heteroscedasticity. The share form was obtained by dividing through Equation 
4.16 by total expenditure, i.e. 
hq
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.                                        (C.2a) 
In addition, in order to replicate expenditures given in the survey, we also 
made use of the following assumption: 
jh
j
jjh
j
j PP **
ˆ~    ,          (C.3) 
where jh*
~
  denotes an adjusted minimum expenditure and jh*ˆ  denotes the 
estimated minimum expenditure.  
Our demand equation is then defined as 
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where qh*
~
  is obtained by inserting the estimate qh*ˆ from (C.2a) and everything 
else from survey data, and using (C.3) to close the remaining degree of freedom.  
Since expenditure shares and non-stochastic terms in our Equation C.2a, 
add up to one for each household, the covariance matrix is singular (due to the fact 
that sum of expenditure should be equal to income), so we dropped one equation. 
Barten (1969) showed that for marginal budget shares,  , it does not matter which 
equation is dropped since results are similar. The parameter of the dropped 
equation was then recovered from the adding-up restriction. Finally, to handle zero 
expenditure, commodities were aggregated to five groups as explained in Section 
5.1.1. 
In the case of q commodities, there will be 6 times q  minus 1 ( 16 q ) 
parameters to be estimated (that is q  0a ’s, q  1a ’s, q  2a ’s, q  3a ’s, q  4a ’s and 
1q  marginal budget shares (  ’s). From 1q  independent equations, a total of 
26 q  independent coefficients can be estimated, yet the system contains 16 q  
parameters. This implies that the system is under-identified. All these 16 q  
parameters can be estimated from a two or more periods’ household survey. 
According to Pollak and Wales (1992), if one of the minimum expenditures is 
known before estimation, then survey data for one period can be used to estimate 
the remaining 1q  minimum expenditure and marginal budget shares. For 
estimation purposes, minimum expenditure for services is assumed to be zero.  
The linear expenditure system is linear in income but nonlinear in 
parameters (Judge et al., 1988), so an iterative approach was used. We used 
STATA’s NLSUR command for estimation. NLSUR asymptotically approximates 
maximum likelihood (www.stata.com). NLSUR was used in order to estimate all 
equations simultaneously while accounting for the possibility of correlated errors 
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as values of the different expenditure categories were collected from the same set 
of households.  
The Income and Expenditure Household Survey, which was used for 
demand estimation, does not have information on household quantities consumed. 
This implies that there will be no corresponding unit value of commodities. For 
simplicity reasons we assumed that all households in the survey face the same 
prices and also that prices are equal to unity for the base period.  Estimation was 
done separately for different races. Detailed estimation results are given in Table 
C.1. 
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Table C.1 : LES equation estimates 
Variable   Coefficient (Standard errors)    
    Blacks  Coloureds Asians  Whites             
Minimum expenditure: 
Agriculture: 
 Constant  111.597***  50.964  546.036**  38.738 
     (16.942)  (44.143)              (151.864)            (144.361) 
 No. of Adults  160.442***           167.183***            313.500*** 104.497*** 
      (6.517)  (19.337)                (57.935) (43.276) 
 No. of children              136.804***         152.7306***  -48.330                 41.480 
      (8.909)  (28.723)                (92.622) (77.573) 
 Location dummy              286.070***           554.098***  559.064** 380.454*** 
    (17.299)              (53.682)              (222.253)               (83.810) 
 Education dummy               -70.726***         -146.854*              -573.690***    -0.513 
                 (17.624)              (54.868)              (149.077)             (145.263) 
Food: 
 Constant              636.415***          751.809***            2360.698***          1001.778***  
    (30.804)            (112.480)              (405.550)              (305.107) 
 No. of Adults              273.260***          458.938*** 892.649***  568.916*** 
                (11.849)             (49.272)              (154.714)               (91.464) 
 No. of children             228.095***           518.230***            276.0516               540.680 
                (16.198)             (73.188)              (247.345)  (163.952) 
 Location dummy             353.687***         1775.333***            2202.724***             -55.856 
                (31.453)           (136.786)              (593.520)              (177.135) 
 Education dummy            -237.637***         -581.167***           -2117.400*** -609.476 
                (32.044)          (139.809)              (398.106)  (307.014) 
 
Manufacturing: 
 Constant               61.410***          -85.722*              -478.456** -621.965*  
                (14.627)            (48.898)              (296.863)              (348.532) 
 No. of Adults  45.962***           48.536**                 66.662    -42.055 
     (5.626)            (21.420)              (113.251)  (104.482) 
 No. of children  43.515***           52.625              -163.389                    8.313 
     (7.694)            (31.817)              (181.057)  (187.286) 
 Location dummy               55.987***         186.949***    826.717*               420.274* 
                (14.935)            (59.465)              (434.458)  (202.345) 
 Education dummy               -1.933          -111.810**                 93.334                522.312 
               (15.216)            (60.779)              (291.414)              (350.710) 
 
Capital goods: 
 Constant            225.124***            304.450***                752.778   559.161*** 
               (11.230)             (40.959)               (273.408) (218.850) 
 No. of Adults            109.522***            209.224***    542.831***  322.473*** 
    (4.320)             (17.942)               (104.303)   (65.606) 
 No. of children              57.033***             90.588  -263.152                -81.054** 
                 (5.905)             (26.651)               (166.752) (117.601) 
 Location dummy             -68.373***            -65.862                 324.668    107.748 
               (11.466)             (49.809)               (400.132) (127.057) 
 Education dummy              31.788**             -10.752                -517.412  -372.074 
               (11.682)             (50.910)                 (268.39) (220.218) 
 
Marginal budget shares: 
Agriculture    0.161***   0.118***       0.081***      0.066*** 
    (0.001)  (0.002)      (0.003)     (0.001) 
Food     0.315***                0.326***                   0.223***      0.172*** 
                 (0.001)  (0.004)      (0.007)     (0.003) 
Manufacturing                 0.121***     0.117***                    0.151***      0.165*** 
(0.01)               (0.003)      (0.006)     (0.003) 
Capital goods    0.103***   0.108***                    0.120***       0.109*** 
                 (0.001)               (0.002)      (0.006)                  (0.002) 
    
  
Notes: 1. *** significant at 1%,    ** significant at 5%,   * significant at 10%. 
           2. “Agriculture” includes agriculture, mining and textiles, “Manufacturing” includes    
manufacturing, petroleum and vehicles and “Capital goods” include capital goods and chemical. 
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Most parameters are significant at 5% level of significance, except for some 
demographic variables which are not significant even at 5% level. For example, 
the number of children is not significant for Asians. A negative sign on minimum 
quantities coefficient denotes a non-essential good that is only consumed if 
income exceeds a certain amount. Marginal effects of supernumerary income 
(income available after all essential quantities have been met) are all significant at 
5% level.   
According to Pollak and Wales (1978), we cannot infer a change in 
consumption of good q , ( qC ) from a change in demographic variable, since 
changes in demographic variables affect all the minimum expenditures ( q ) 
simultaneously. For example, we cannot infer a change in quantity consumed of 
food from an increase in number of adults, which causes an increase in minimum 
expenditure for food. Instead, a change in demographic variables causes a 
reallocation of expenditure among the consumption categories, since total 
expenditure remains fixed. Any increase in consumption of some goods should be 
balanced by decrease in the consumption of other goods.  
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Appendix D: Poverty and inequality indices 
The Appendix explains various indices used for poverty and inequality analysis.   
 
Poverty 
For poverty analysis we used the Foster Greer Thorbecke index. 
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where P  is the poverty measure, j is a subgroup of individuals with income 
below the poverty line ( z ), N is the number of individuals in the sample, and jy  
is income of the thj  individual. The parameter  reflects poverty aversion and it 
can take three possible values: 
 The poverty headcount ( 0 )  
It measures the proportion of the population whose income or consumption is 
below the poverty line. The index does not give a measure of the extent of 
poverty; for example it does not provide information on how far households are 
from the poverty line.  
 The average normalized poverty gap / poverty depth  ( 1 )  
It measures how far households are away from the poverty line. Its main weakness 
is that it may not capture difference in severity of poverty; that is, how large is the 
inequality among the poor. 
 Severity of poverty/ average squared normalized poverty gap  ( 2 ) 
Measures both how far households are from the poverty line and also how large is 
the inequality among the poor. 
 
Inequality 
 
The following indices were used for income inequality analysis.  
 Relative mean deviation (RMD)  
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It gives the ratio of the sum of the absolute value of distance between each income 
in the distribution and the mean income to total income. The formula is given 
below.  
Mean difference (MD):  

 ji yy
nn
MD
)1(
1
,    (D.2) 
RMD= MD/ Arithmetic mean of y,      (D.3) 
where iy  is income of individual i .  
The main disadvantage of this measure is that it is not sensitive to transfers 
between people on the same side of the mean income; hence it violates the transfer 
axiom, which states that a transfer from poorer to a richer person must result in an 
increase in inequality (ceteris paribus). 
 Coefficient of variation  
It is a normalized measure of dispersion. It is defined as the ratio of the standard 
deviation over the mean. 
Coefficient of variation= Standard deviation/ Mean   (D.4) 
The index attaches equal weight to transfers anywhere in the distribution.  
 Gini coefficient  
The index was proposed by Gini in 1912, and it is one of the most widely used 
measures of inequality. The index varies from zero (indicating absolute equality) 
to one (indicating absolute inequality). The Gini coefficient can be calculated from 
the Lorenz curve as illustrated on the next diagram. 
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Figure D.1: Lorenz curve diagram 
 
Note: Gini coefficient= Area between Lorenz curve and line of perfect equality (A)/ Total area 
below line of equality (A+B).     
The main disadvantage of the Gini coefficient is that it attaches more weight to 
transfers at the middle of the distribution than in the tails of the distribution 
(Atkinson, 1970). In addition the measure is not readily decomposable.  
 Theil index  
It is a member of the generalized entropy methods. Unlike the previous indices it 
is not derived from the Lorenz curve. The index measures an entropic "distance" 
the population is away from the "ideal” mean (state of everyone having the same 
income). The formula for the generalized entropy measure is given as: 
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1  gives the Theil index (Equation D.6): 
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45 degree line 
Lorenz curve 
Cummulative 
% of income 
Cummulative % of population 
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0  gives the Mean Log deviation (Equation D.7). 
 
. 
     (D.7) 
Where iy , is the income of the i
th
 individual or subgroup,  is the mean income of the 
individual or subgroups, and N  is the population. Parameter  indicates individuals’ 
different perceptions to inequality. A lower value of  indicates a higher degree of 
inequality aversion. This index indicates the extent to which inequality in the population 
as a whole is attributable to inequality within each population group, or between 
population groups. Its main advantage is that it can be decomposed across different 
subgroups. But it has the following disadvantages; firstly, it is an arbitrary measure of 
inequality. Secondly, it is insensitive to inequality among high income earners but very 
sensitive to inequality among relatively low income earners. 
 Atkinson index (AI)  
It is a welfare based measure of inequality. Its main feature is that it can gauge 
movements in different segments of income distribution. The index is equal to 
zero when incomes are equally distributed and moves towards unity as inequality 
increases. The main formula for calculating this index is given below.  
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where iy  denotes the income of person i  in a population of N  people with mean 
 . e  is the inequality aversion parameter, which reflects strength of society’s 
preference for inequality. When e  is greater than zero, there is social preference 
for equality. The Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes at the lower 
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end of the income distribution as e  approaches unity. An e  equal to zero implies 
neutrality to inequality.  
According to Atkinson (1970) the index AI can be interpreted as expressing  
the cost of inequality  in terms of a proportionate amount of income that could be 
subtracted from the mean without affecting social welfare level  as follows, 
 

EDEyAI 1 ,        (D.8a) 
where EDEy  represents equally distributed equivalent income, which can be defined 
as the level of income which, if equally distributed, would give the same level of 
social welfare as the present distribution. The more equal the income distribution, 
the lower will be the value of Atkinson index and the closer will be EDEy  to  . 
Solving for EDEy  from Equation D.8a gives: 
WAIyEDE  )1( ,        (D.8b) 
which gives the same measure of welfare (W ) as the Sen’s welfare index 
(Equation D.9).    
 
 Sen’s welfare index  
Sen extended Atkinson’s index to a more general case where welfare is non -
additive.  The formula for calculating this index is given below. 
)1( GW   ,         (D.9) 
where W measures welfare,   is mean income and G  is Gini coefficient. Welfare 
is increasing in mean, but decreasing in inequality. The measure captures the idea 
of trade-off between efficiency and inequality that is we are willing to trade more 
mean for a more equal distribution and vice versa.   
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Appendix E: General Appendix 
 
Table E.1 : Total households per group 
Household group                 Frequency Household group                Frequency 
1                                        1 407 
2                                        1 213 
3                                        1 022 
4                                        2 645 
5                                        1 555 
6                                          553 
7                                          960 
8                                        1 124 
9                                        2 656 
10                                      1 115 
11                                        818 
12                                        893 
13                                      3 037 
14                                        340 
15                                        881 
16                                        347 
17                                        203 
18                                        226 
19                                        134 
20                                        661 
21                                        218 
22                                        159 
23                                          94 
24                                        241 
25                                        281 
26                                        174 
27                                          62 
28                                          98 
29                                          66 
30                                          36 
31                                          21 
32                                          27 
33                                            9 
34                                          48 
35                                          23 
36                                        328 
37                                          14 
38                                          32 
39                                            8 
40                                          40 
42                                            2 
44                                           11 
49                                             4 
 
50                                         37 
51                                         26 
52                                     1 300 
53                                           4 
54                                         12 
55                                         10 
56                                       371 
57                                           2 
58                                           6 
59                                           6 
60                                       250 
64                                         25 
Total                               25 835 
Source: Own Table. 
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Table E.2: Production levels 
 Option 1 (%) Option 2 (%) 
Agriculture 0.7 0.6 
Food 1.2 0.5 
Manufacturing -0.2 -2.3 
Capital goods --- -1.1 
Services -0.1 -1.1 
Total --- -1.1 
Source: Own Table. 
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Table E.3: Income elasticity of demand for 64 household groups 
Rhg c_agri c_food c_manf c_capg c_serv 
1 1.087 0.631 1.388 1.183 1.679 
2 1.362 0.812 0.993 1.212 1.045 
3 1.130 0.634 1.393 1.199 1.594 
4 1.609 1.129 0.727 1.749 0.758 
5 1.030 0.656 1.454 1.036 1.658 
6 1.211 0.749 1.149 1.378 1.125 
7 1.136 0.651 1.699 1.056 1.460 
8 1.535 1.090 1.027 1.527 0.712 
9 0.832 0.608 1.418 1.621 2.144 
10 1.081 0.784 0.880 1.963 1.157 
11 0.895 0.623 1.360 1.441 1.942 
12 1.232 0.975 0.724 1.701 0.942 
13 0.822 0.593 1.556 1.502 2.365 
14 1.020 0.753 0.893 1.428 1.387 
15 0.874 0.625 1.272 1.316 2.168 
16 1.204 0.984 0.734 1.691 0.937 
17 0.985 0.645 1.521 1.242 1.572 
18 1.070 0.744 1.035 1.511 1.241 
19 0.965 0.626 1.850 0.847 1.993 
20 1.505 1.115 0.810 1.662 0.788 
21 0.993 0.589 1.942 0.994 2.091 
22 0.965 0.681 1.234 1.374 1.469 
23 0.981 0.578 2.416 1.066 2.000 
24 1.201 0.953 1.356 1.355 0.841 
25 0.897 0.523 2.084 1.853 2.532 
26 0.887 0.643 1.328 1.987 1.523 
27 0.956 0.526 1.639 1.691 2.733 
28 1.073 0.695 0.961 2.076 1.338 
29 0.827 0.582 1.800 1.465 2.098 
30 0.721 0.620 1.224 1.728 2.169 
31 0.784 0.531 3.292 1.397 2.709 
32 0.889 0.670 1.502 1.573 1.412 
33 0.980 0.465 6.105 0.749 1.683 
34 0.900 0.637 1.338 1.234 1.213 
35 0.782 0.487 3.575 0.989 1.542 
36 1.226 0.835 0.952 1.683 0.972 
37 0.628 0.459 2.418 0.982 2.112 
38 0.780 0.526 1.716 1.315 1.448 
39 3.233 0.497 1.378 1.018 1.423 
40 1.032 0.738 1.362 1.335 1.015 
42 1.023 0.368 1.446 1.237 3.720 
44 1.300 0.638 1.246 0.797 1.343 
49 0.789 0.476 1.526 1.194 1.372 
50 1.394 0.614 1.021 1.159 1.172 
51 1.110 0.293 4.076 1.608 2.001 
52 1.320 0.909 0.941 1.665 0.939 
53 1.075 0.408 25.548 1.068 1.194 
54 2.027 1.134 0.844 1.583 0.886 
55 0.956 0.543 6.849 0.554 1.238 
56 1.240 0.849 1.104 1.763 0.916 
57 0.825 0.225 2.434 1.978 15.721 
58 0.718 0.975 1.459 1.159 0.930 
59 0.369 0.251 8.387 3.653 5.739 
60 0.656 1.126 0.863 1.823 0.985 
64 1.189 0.781 1.552 1.300 0.914 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table E.4: Frisch parameters for 64 household groups 
Rhg                             Frisch Rhg                               Frisch 
1                                     1.455 
2                                     1.057 
3                                     1.386  
4                                     1.031 
5                                     1.469 
6                                     1.059 
7                                     1.371 
8                                     1.034 
9                                     1.682 
10                                   1.076 
11                                   1.626 
12                                   1.056 
13                                   1.756 
14                                   1.066 
15                                   1.640 
16                                   1.051  
17                                   1.701 
18                                   1.090 
19                                   1.683 
20                                   1.031 
21                                   1.770 
22                                   1.099 
23                                   1.526 
24                                   1.038 
25                                   3.138 
26                                   1.173 
27                                   2.140 
28                                   1.127 
29                                   2.830  
30                                   1.195 
31                                   1.767 
32                                   1.147 
33                                   2.797 
34                                   1.108 
35                                   2.013 
36                                   1.038 
37                                   3.304 
38                                   1.180 
39                                   2.042 
40                                   1.035 
42                                   1.748 
 
44                                     1.078 
49                                     1.062 
50                                     1.014  
51                                     2.980 
52                                     1.012 
53                                     2.347 
54                                     1.005 
55                                     1.832 
56                                     1.013 
57                                     2.015 
58                                     1.023 
59                                     1.726 
60                                     1.009 
64                                     1.023 
 
Source: Own Table. 
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Table E.5: Percentage changes in real income by household group 
Household Group Option1  Option2 
Urban African, male headed, educated and low income household 22.188  19.614 
Urban African, male headed, educated and high income households -0.248  -3.478 
Urban African, male headed, uneducated and low income households 10.545  7.765 
Urban African, male headed, uneducated and high income households -0.312  -3.716 
Urban African, female headed, educated and low income households 30.112  27.796 
Urban African, female headed, educated and high income households -0.386  -3.651 
Urban African, female headed, uneducated and low income households 15.124  12.239 
Urban African, female headed, uneducated and high income households -0.381  -3.643 
Rural African, male headed, educated and low income households 31.263  28.859 
Rural African, male headed, educated and high income households -0.412  -3.919 
Rural African, male headed, uneducated and low income households 14.159  11.323 
Rural African, male headed, uneducated and high income households -0.430  -4.083 
Rural African, female headed, educated and low income households 38.988  37.079 
Rural African, female headed, educated and high income households -0.612  -4.155 
Rural African, female headed, uneducated and low income households 20.833  18.593 
Rural African, female headed, uneducated and high income households -0.471  -3.936 
Urban Coloreds, male headed, educated and low income household 24.397  21.797 
Urban Coloreds, male headed, educated and high income households -0.103  -2.932 
Urban Coloreds, male headed, uneducated and low income households 17.247  15.008 
Urban Coloreds, male headed, uneducated and high income households -0.273  -3.595 
Urban Coloreds, female headed, educated and low income households 37.146  35.238 
Urban Coloreds, female headed, educated and high income households -0.148  -2.819 
Urban Coloreds, female headed, uneducated and low income households 25.936  23.570 
Urban Coloreds, female headed, uneducated and high income households -0.293  -3.403 
Rural Coloreds, male headed, educated and low income households 20.305  18.145 
Rural Coloreds, male headed, educated and high income households -0.116  -3.016 
Rural Coloreds, male headed, uneducated and low income households 10.328  7.740 
Rural Coloreds, male headed, uneducated and high income households -0.184  -3.282 
Rural Coloreds, female headed, educated and low income households 37.161  35.466 
Rural Coloreds, female headed, educated and high income households -0.111  -2.663 
Rural Coloreds, female headed, uneducated and low income households 19.073  16.652 
Rural Coloreds, female headed, uneducated and high income households -0.123  -2.896 
Urban Asians, male headed, educated and low income household 40.317  38.773 
Urban Asians, male headed, educated and high income households -0.430  -3.936 
Urban Asians, male headed, uneducated and low income households 22.716  19.777 
Urban Asians, male headed, uneducated and high income households -0.361  -3.849 
Urban Asians, female headed, educated and low income households 30.282  28.029 
Urban Asians, female headed, educated and high income households -0.264  -3.138 
Urban Asians, female headed, uneducated and low income households 31.506  28.354 
Urban Asians, female headed, uneducated and high income households -0.690  -4.562 
Rural Asians, male headed, educated and high income households 0.008  -2.787 
Rural Asians, male headed, uneducated and high income households 0.891  -5.510 
Urban Whites, male headed, educated and low income household 9.791  -4.795 
Urban Whites, male headed, educated and high income households -0.881  -5.506 
Urban Whites, male headed, uneducated and low income households 13.423  8.630 
Urban Whites, male headed, uneducated and high income households -0.537  -4.417 
Urban Whites, female headed, educated and low income households 49.647  48.629 
Urban Whites, female headed, educated and high income households -1.423  -7.094 
Urban Whites, female headed, uneducated and low income households 62.948  61.957 
Urban Whites, female headed, uneducated and high income households -0.615  -4.463 
Rural Whites, male headed, educated and low income households 2.173  -0.438 
Rural Whites, male headed, educated and high income households -0.696  -4.691 
Rural Whites, male headed, uneducated and low income households 5.544  3.046 
Rural Whites, male headed, uneducated and high income households -1.056  -7.121 
Rural Whites, female headed, uneducated and high income households -0.706  -4.850 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 122 
 
Affirmation 
 
 
 
 
I hereby affirm that I have completed my doctoral thesis entitled, " Government 
social assistance, income inequality and poverty in South Africa: A computable 
general equilibrium- microsimulation model "   entirely on my own and unassisted, 
and that I have specially marked all of the quotes I have used from other authors 
as well as those passages in my work that are extremely close to the thoughts 
presented by other authors, and listed the sources in accordance with the 
regulations I have been given. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date          Signature 
 
-----------------------       ------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 
Charity Gomo 
Flat no. 3 Lydiana hof complex 
20 Mispel Street 
Pretoria, 0184 
South Africa 
 
Eidesstattliche Erklärung 
 
Ich erkläre hiermit an Eides Statt, dass ich meine Doktorarbeit 
 
“Government social assistance transfers, income inequality and poverty in South Africa: 
A computable general equilibrium – Microsimulation model."  
 
Selbständig und ohne fremde Hilfe angefertigt habe und dass ich alle von anderen 
Autoren wörtlich übernommenen Stellen, wie auch die sich an die Gedanken anderer 
Autoren eng anlehnenden Ausführungen meiner Arbeit, besonders gekennzeichnet und 
die Quellen nach den mir angegebenen Richtlinien zitiert habe.  
 
Die Arbeit hat bisher in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form oder auszugsweise noch keiner 
Prufungsbehorde vorgelegen. 
 
 
Kiel, den      July 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
   CURRICULUM VITAE 
CHARITY GOMO        
charisoc@yahoo.com       
         
EDUCATION:   
M.Sc. in Economics degree             
   University of Zimbabwe:    Degree class: Pass with merit  
 B.Sc. honours in Economics              
      University of Zimbabwe Degree class:     Upper second class (2.1) 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE:  
1. National Treasury, South Africa: Senior Economist  2014- to date 
2. Rhodes University, South Africa: Lecturer    2012-2014 
3. University of Witwatersrand South Africa: Lecturer   2004-2007 
            
RESEARCH SEMINARS/WORKSHOPS/SYMPOSIA/CONFERENCES 
Brown bag seminar, University of Kiel- July 2009 
Prof Bröcker’s doctoral seminar – July 2009, Dec 2009, July 2010, Dec 2010 
14
th
 international student conference- EGE University, Izmir, Turkey, May 2011 
9th Development Dialogue- ISS Hague Netherlands, June 2011 
 
 
 
